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Regality theory is a theory saying that people show a preference 
for strong leadership in times of war or collective danger, but a 
preference for an egalitarian political system in times of peace and 
safety. These psychological preferences in individuals are reflected in 
the political structure and culture of the society. A society in danger will 
develop strong nationalism, discipline, strict religiosity, strict sexual 
morals and perfectionist art. A society in peace will develop in the 
direction of egalitarianism and tolerance. 
The article is both theoretical and experimental. Regality theory 
is explained and the theoretical basis of the theory is extended with 
contributions from evolutionary game theory, biological life history 
theory and ecological theory. 
The predictions of social-level effects of collective danger are 
tested by various statistical methods exploring the relationship between 
intergroup conflict and a number of indicators of social structure and 
culture in 186 non-industrial societies of the past based on data from 
Murdock and White's standard cross-cultural sample as well as a 
subsample based on ethnographic records. It is confirmed that a high 
level of intergroup conflict is connected with a hierarchical political 
system, a strict and punitive justice system, a strict religiosity, a high 
feeling of group identity, strict sexual morals, a higher workload on 
children, and embellished and perfectionist artistic expressions. Four 
other predicted effects do not show statistical significance. Intragroup 
conflict influences sexual morals but not the other cultural variables. It 
is also found that the level of conflict can be predicted from 
environmental and technological factors. 
Regality theory is compared with authoritarianism theory and 
various cultural theories. While some of these theories appear to 
describe related or identical phenomena, it is found that regality theory 
is the theory that best predicts the statistical results. Regality theory 
has important applications in both the natural and the social sciences, 
including the study of many psychological, political and cultural 
phenomena. 
 
Keywords: war, intergroup conflict, free rider problem, leadership, 
psychological flexibility, phenotypic plasticity, social structure 
adaptation, authoritarian personality, regal versus kungic culture. 
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Introduction 
It is easy to observe that some cultures are warlike and 
totalitarian while other cultures are peaceful and tolerant [1]; it is more 
difficult to explain why. Regality theory is a theory that seeks to explain 
such cultural differences as adaptations to different levels of intergroup 
conflict or collective danger that societies are exposed to [2]. According 
to this theory, there is a psychological mechanism that makes people 
prefer a strong leader and strict discipline when the probability of war 
or other collective danger is perceived to be high. In the absence of 
collective danger, people will prefer an egalitarian society with a more 
lax discipline. The combined effect of such psychological responses in 
the individual members of a society has important emergent 
consequences for the social and cultural structure of the whole society. 
 
The theory of regal and kungic societies 
Evolutionary basis 
It has often been observed that people prefer a strong leader 
and a strong social group in times of crisis [3], [4], [5] and various 
scientists have independently suggested that this may be an adaptive 
response to the need for collective action [3], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However, 
the discussion of why this would be adaptive has so far been missing. 
We will propose that a psychological mechanism that makes people 
prefer a strong leader in times of intergroup conflict could be adaptive 
because it reduces or eliminates the free-rider problem in collective 
fighting. 
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the 
altruistic behavior of individuals who fight for their social group despite 
the fitness costs. The most important evolutionary explanations that 
have previously been proposed are: kin selection, group selection [10], 
[11], reciprocal selection [12], [13], altruistic punishment, prestige, 
sexual selection (women are attracted to brave warriors) [14], [15] the 
opportunity of successful warriors to mate with captured women from 
the losing group [14], [16], [17], and cultural group selection [18]. 
It is a common characteristic of these proposed mechanisms 
that the effects may be weak, and perhaps too weak to compensate for 
the extremely high fitness costs of fighting [19]. The fitness gain in the 
form of increased mating opportunities does not necessarily go to the 
ones that have run the highest risks; and the mechanism of punishing 
defectors involves the complication that punishing is an altruistic act as 
well that needs explanation [20]. 
We are now proposing that the following mechanism may have 
been important in the evolution of collective fighting. In the event of 
war, or imminent war, the members of a social group will show a 
psychological preference for having a strong leader and a social 
system with strict discipline. If enough members of the group express 
these preferences then the group will soon develop a hierarchical 
political structure with a strong and powerful leader who can command 
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group members to fight, devise a strategy, reward brave warriors and 
punish defectors. 
There is an important difference between being willing to fight 
for one's social group and being willing to support a strong leader. The 
altruistic individual who volunteers to fight for his group will run a high 
personal risk while all the non-fighting members of his group will benefit 
from his bravery. As the cost to the individual warrior is higher than his 
share of the group-level gain, his behavior will not be promoted by 
natural selection. But the strategy of supporting a strong leader is 
different. If only few members of the group desire a strong leader then 
there will be no strong leader and no collective fighting. If enough 
group members support a strong leader then this leader will be able to 
dominate over everybody, including the minority that do not support 
him, and command them to fight. Thus, it is possible for the group to 
suppress the fitness advantage of free riding by installing a strong 
leader. The individual who shows the preference for a strong leader will 
not only have to carry the costs of fighting, he will also enjoy the 
benefits of everybody else fighting. Either everybody fights or nobody 
fights; there is no place for free riders. The group-level benefit of 
everybody fighting in a coordinated way could very well be sufficiently 
high to outweigh the individual fitness costs of fighting, even when the 
benefit is divided between all group members.  
The behavior of the leader is easy to explain. The costs to the 
leader of rewarding and punishing are more than compensated for by 
the fitness advantage of being a leader or having a high position in the 
hierarchy of a successful group [21]. 
We can expect that a system including both reward and 
punishment will be more efficient than a system based on punishment 
alone for promoting a complex task such as fighting, where extra-
ordinary above-average skills are particularly valuable. A system based 
on punishment only would make warriors deliver the minimum 
performance necessary to avoid punishment; and defectors might even 
avoid punishment if they could convincingly fake illness. A punishment 
system could possibly evolve by other mechanisms if the costs of 
punishing are sufficiently low [20], but rewards are typically more costly 
to deliver than punishments and require a higher payback to evolve. 
There is a tradeoff between the benefit of being part of a strong 
and powerful political organization and the cost of repression within the 
organization [21]. This balance is likely to be tipped in a peaceful 
environment where the need for collective protection is low. The 
individual would have no reason to submit to a strong leader in this 
case. On the contrary, the individual would most likely see his own 
fitness reduced by a despotic male leader who could take advantage of 
everybody else and even monopolize a large number of women [22]. 
Therefore, the optimal strategy for the individual must be to have a 
flexible psychology, showing a preference for strong leadership and 
strict discipline when intergroup conflicts are frequent or expected, but 
a preference for an egalitarian social structure when intergroup 
conflicts are perceived to be unlikely. The group-level effect of this 
psychological flexibility is that the higher the level of intergroup conflict, 
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the more the group will invest in a strong organization that strengthens 
its ability to organize collective fighting. 
Such a group with a strong organization and fighting spirit is 
called regal, while we will use the word kungic (or kalyptic) for a group 
that has adjusted to peace. The same words are used for the individual 
psychological preferences that lead to strong or weak group 
organization, respectively. 
Throughout human history, the majority of warriors have been 
men. Evolutionary explanations for this division of labor have often 
been discussed; see e.g. [14]. We will assume, nevertheless, that it is 
advantageous for a woman to support a strong leader in case of 
collective danger and to prefer an egalitarian social structure in case of 
peace and safety. Even if a woman is never engaged in direct combat, 
she still stands the risk of suffering under enemy attack if her group is 
weak and not organized for fighting. 
Cultural effects 
An important finding of regality theory is that the psychological 
flexibility at the individual level gives rise to an emergent flexibility at 
the cultural level. The more the social group is affected by intergroup 
conflicts, the more hierarchical will the social structure be and the 
stricter the discipline. The social group is likely to increase its fighting 
power by strengthening its organization, armament, morals, ideology 
and fighting spirit as a response to escalation in its enemies. The 
theory does not rule out a certain degree of intelligent decision-making 
when e.g. a group decides to recruit more soldiers and strengthen their 
military organization when facing the threat of a bellicose neighbor 
group or the opportunity for subduing a weak neighbor group [2]. 
The word regal denotes both the psychological preferences for a 
strong leader and also the resulting social structure, culture and ethos 
of a social group that is characterized by a high level of intergroup 
conflict, perceived collective danger or high military strength and 
discipline. The word kungic denotes the opposite. 
Not only the morals and discipline are changed by the regal 
strategy. It appears that also a lot of other cultural expressions, such as 
religion, art and music, are changed along the regal versus kungic 
dimension to obtain psychological congruence between the different 
aspects of the culture. Various forms of art are efficient means for 
communicating ideological values and cultural unity [23]; and music 
style, in particular, has been observed to correlate with social structure, 
lifestyle, personality and political preferences [24], [25], [26], [27] (see, 
though [28]). 
The cultural characteristics that we expect to be typical for regal 
and kungic societies are listed in table 1. It has been observed that 
societies can change in these characteristics not only as a response to 
changing threats of war but also as a response to other dangers that 
threaten the social group as a whole, such as economic crisis, famine, 
natural disasters [29], [30], and even imaginary dangers such as 
witches and devils [31]. It is therefore possible that the observed 
psychological response is a general mechanism of adaptation to the 
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level of danger that threatens the social group as a whole, or perhaps 
even to any problem that requires collective effort to solve [2]. The 
effects of dangers to the individual may be different, as discussed in 
the section about life history theory below. 
 
Table 1. Regal and kungic cultural indicators. 
Regal societies Kungic societies 
A hierarchical political system with 
a strong leader 
A flat and egalitarian political 
system 
Strong feeling of national or tribal 
identity High individualism 
Strict discipline and punishment of 
deviants 
Lax discipline and high tolerance 
of deviants 
Xenophobia Tolerance of foreigners 
Belief that individuals exist for the 
benefit of society 
Belief that society exists for the 
benefit of individuals 
Strict religion Religion has little or no disciplining power 
Strict sexual morals High sexual freedom 
High birthrate Low birthrate 
Low parental investment, i.e. short 
childhood and low education Long childhood and education 
Low marrying age High marrying age 
Low suicide rate (except for 
culturally prescribed reasons) High rate of anomic suicide 
Art and music is perfectionist, 
highly embellished and follows 
specific schemes 
Art and music express individual 
fantasy with appreciation of 
individuality and innovativeness 
 
Contributions from ecological theory 
In ecology and niche theory, the competitive exclusion principle 
says that complete competitors cannot coexist indefinitely [32]. While 
this principle has been applied mostly to the areas of ecology and 
economics, other aspects of niche theory have been successfully 
applied to eco-cultural specialization [33], [34]. If we apply the 
competitive exclusion principle to human societies, then we cannot 
expect two social groups in close proximity to live in peace if they are 
adapted to the same environment and depend on the same resources. 
The two competing groups may merge, separate, differentiate, or fight. 
But they may not coexist indefinitely unless something prevents them 
from fighting, such as geographic barriers, technical difficulties, or third 
party intervention. 
There is archaeological evidence of at least some degree of 
human fighting in prehistory [35], [36], but the evidence also shows that 
violence was more common in some areas than in others, apparently 
due to settlement patterns and environmental factors such as the 
concentration and defendability of resources [37], [38], [39]. Mass 
killings did not occur everywhere. They took place mainly in sedentary 
cultures and most markedly in connection with agriculture or otherwise 
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defendable resources [37], [38]. Nomadic hunter-gatherers would flee 
more often than fight and thus rarely die in a battlefield, but more likely 
die from malnutrition and diseases after fleeing to an inferior territory. 
It may be possible to roughly predict the degree of intergroup 
conflict for a particular culture if we consider the ecology, mode of 
subsistence, available technology and geography. Conflicts are unlikely 
for a social group that has adapted to its own specialized niche, but 
likely for a group that depends on the same niche as a close-by 
neighbor group. Conflicts can be impeded if traveling is difficult 
because of geographic barriers or if it is technically difficult to collect 
and transport sufficient food and water for supporting a troop of 
warriors. 
If food is sparse, and consequently the population density is low, 
then it will be difficult to assemble a sufficiently large group of warriors 
for attacking the enemy; the warriors will have a long way to travel; and 
it will be difficult to supply enough food for the warriors. Some people 
find it counterintuitive that low food supply should lead to peace. 
However, we have to distinguish between a low but stable food supply, 
and a fluctuating food supply. If the food supply is permanently sparse, 
but stable, then the population density will necessarily be low. Imagine 
a landscape where food is sparsely distributed and people live in small 
villages or camps far distanced from each other. How would it be 
possible to assemble enough warriors from allied neighbor groups to 
attack an enemy, travel together to the distant enemy territory, and 
provide and transport enough food and other necessities for the 
traveling troops? The logistic problems simply make large-scale war 
impossible in the absence of technological means for food preservation 
and transport here. However, if food is plentiful then the population 
density will soon become high, geographical distances between enemy 
groups is likely to be shorter, and it will be easier to organize larger 
political groups. If, furthermore, the food supply is fluctuating and 
unpredictable, then there will be occasional periods of famine where 
people will fight over the insufficient supply of food. 
In conclusion, we will predict that the level of intergroup conflict 
will be low in areas where food is sparse or where mountains, dense 
vegetation, aridity, or other environmental factors make traveling 
difficult. On the other hand, we can expect frequent wars where food 
production is efficient and defendable and there are efficient means of 
traveling and food preservation. The predictability of the food supply is 
also important. Unpredictable famine and natural disasters are factors 
known to cause war [29], [38]. 
Contributions from life history theory 
The regal versus kungic culture dimension has an interesting 
connection with the fast versus slow life history strategy dimension in 
evolutionary ecology. A fast life history strategy, or r-strategy, means 
that individuals start early to reproduce, have many children and care 
little for each child. A slow strategy, or K-strategy, means a high age at 
first reproduction, few children, and a high investment in the care and 
upbringing of each child. Humans have a relatively slow life history 
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strategy compared with most animals [40]. This strategy is not 
completely fixed. Recent research has shown that there is some room 
for individual differences and adjustment to the environment. Several 
studies have found that humans are choosing a faster life history 
strategy when they live in an environment where the mortality and 
morbidity of adults is high. A slower life history strategy is chosen 
where the mortality is low, where resources are predictable and 
defendable, and where the population density is near the carrying 
capacity of the environment [41], [42], [43], [44]. Economic factors and 
education also influence the strategy [45]. 
While the fast versus slow life history theory sees reproductive 
strategy from the point of view of the individual, the regal versus kungic 
culture theory is also concerned with a social-level perspective. The 
optimal strategy from the perspective of the social group in times of war 
is to produce many children and to raise them as quickly as possible to 
become fierce warriors. In times of peace, the optimal strategy from the 
group's perspective is to produce few children in order to avoid 
overexploitation of the environment and ecological collapse. Group 
selection theory has not provided a satisfactory explanation of why 
reproduction is limited, but life history theory seems to provide at least 
part of the explanation. 
In times of war, the mortality is high and individuals will choose a 
fast life history strategy. In times of peace and stability, we can expect 
the population density to match the carrying capacity of the 
environment and we can expect to see a slow life history strategy. The 
interesting observation is that there is a fairly good agreement between 
the interests of the group according to regality theory and the interests 
of the individual according to life history theory. There is some degree 
of synergy between the two mechanisms and we will expect a positive 
correlation between regality and fast life history strategy. 
However, there is one important difference between the 
predictions of the two theories. Regality theory predicts that fertility will 
go up as a response to collective danger that requires collective action, 
while the fast versus slow life history theory predicts that fertility will go 
up as a response to any danger, including dangers that affect only the 
individual. 
 
Testing the theory on ethnographic data 
The following predictions can be made from the theories 
outlined above: 
 
1. People will show a preference for a strong leader and a 
social structure with strict discipline in cases of a high level of 
intergroup conflict or other collective danger. They will show 
a preference for an egalitarian social structure in the 
absence of collective danger. 
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2. These individual preferences will influence the social and 
cultural structure in the directions called regal and kungic, 
respectively, as reflected in the indicators listed in table 1. 
3. A society with a high level of intergroup conflict will use both 
reward and punishment of its members to enhance its 
military strength. 
4. Individual danger and intragroup conflict will not have the 
same effect on social structure as collective danger and 
intergroup conflict have. But both kinds of danger will have 
the same effect on fertility. 
5. The level of intergroup conflict will depend on the geographic 
and technological environment. Efficient food production and 
efficient means of transportation will increase the occurrence 
and intensity of intergroup conflict, while sparseness of food 
and water, geographic and other barriers to travel, and 
specialization to a unique niche are factors that will decrease 
the level of intergroup conflict. 
 
No other known theory generates the same set of predictions. 
We can therefore compare our theory with alternative theories by 
testing these predictions. A discussion of alternative theories is 
provided on page 27 after the experimental section. 
The predictions of social-level effects should preferably be 
tested on distinct sociocultural groups. We prefer to compare different 
societies that have as little connection with each other as possible in 
order to avoid spurious correlations due to cultural diffusion or common 
descent. Since almost all contemporary cultures are heavily influenced 
by modern western culture, we have chosen to rely on ethnographic 
data from non-industrial cultures of the past. The available 
archaeological data are insufficient for statistical testing, so we will use 
data mainly from ethnographic studies of non-industrial cultures. We 
will use these data to test the predictions listed above. The predictions 
of regality theory have not previously been subjected to cross-cultural 
statistical testing. 
 
Data and methods 
We are presenting two statistical studies here. Study one is 
based on the database known as Murdock and White's standard cross-
cultural sample, while study two is based mainly on data extracted 
directly from the original ethnographic literature. 
Study one 
Murdock and White's standard cross-cultural sample (SCCS) is 
a database covering more than a thousand variables recorded for 186 
non-industrial societies around the world [46]. These societies are 
intended to form a representative sample of world cultures studied at a 
time when cultural independence was higher than today. The data are 
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based on ethnographic records, many of which were collected by early 
explorers in the 19th and early 20th century. 
The variables include information about subsistence ecology, 
intergroup relations, political organization, culture, beliefs and child 
rearing practices [47], [48]. Relevant variables from the SCCS were 
used in study one. All statistical calculations were done in the R 
programming language [49]. 
 
Data quality. The quality of the data in the SCCS is far from 
perfect, but it is the best available. The data have been collected from 
the original ethnographic literature and coded into a database. This 
process involves many potential sources of error, despite elaborate 
precautions. The native informants that have been interviewed; the 
anthropologists or explorers conducting the field studies; the coders 
who interpreted the original literature and coded it into predefined 
categories for the database; and the database designers who defined 
the variables and categories to include in the database - all of these 
persons may have influenced the data by their own agendas, 
predilections, selectivity, taboos and language problems. Most of the 
field studies were conducted many years ago, and often by persons 
without adequate scientific training, such as explorers and missionaries 
(see appendix 1). 
Re-reading some of the original ethnographic literature revealed 
several flaws in the database, mainly due to imprecise definitions of the 
categories in soft areas such as religion, morals and psychology. The 
data in the SCCS appear to be poor in the area of religion and quite 
uncertain in other areas of the soft sciences, and particularly in taboo-
ridden areas such as sexual behavior [50]. 
Many data values are coded as missing, and it was suspected 
that data might be missing for nonrandom reasons. For some 
variables, more than half of the data values were missing. We suspect 
that the coders have tended to err on the side of caution and entered 
the code for "data not available" rather than "trait absent" when a 
particular trait is not mentioned in the ethnographic literature for a 
particular society. This leads to a systematic bias when data are more 
likely to be coded as missing when a trait is absent than when it is 
present. This suspicion was tested statistically by correlating 
missingness for each of the variables against the factors that emerge 
from a factor analysis as described below. This correlation was highly 
significant (p < 0.001) for several relevant variables. It is quite 
understandable, for example, that the value for "Leadership during 
battle" is coded as "data not available" if there is no battle, but the 
statistical model does not work correctly if data are missing for 
nonrandom reasons. Hence, it is better to replace "data not available" 
with "no leadership during battle" here. Similar replacements were 
made for the variables "Despotic bias in conflict resolution", and 
"Interpersonal violence". 
 
Exploratory factor analysis. A factor analysis was performed 
on the standard cross-cultural sample in order to test whether conflict 
and danger would form a single factor or split into two factors: one for 
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external conflict and collective danger, and one for local conflict and 
individual danger. Furthermore, we wanted to see whether cultural 
indicators of regality such as hierarchy and discipline have loadings on 
these factors. 
The database includes more than a thousand variables for each 
society, but not all variables were relevant for the present study. Factor 
analysis requires that the number of variables must be less than the 
number of societies in order to avoid that the covariance matrix 
becomes singular. It was therefore necessary to exclude most vari-
ables and retain only those considered most relevant. Variables that 
had little or no relevance to the purpose of the current analysis, such 
as language and geographic region, were excluded. Excluded were 
also: categorical variables that could not be made ordinal, variables 
where more than half the values were missing, and variables with low 
variance or high uniqueness. Unfortunately, many of the variables that 
are relevant to regality theory had to be excluded from the factor ana-
lysis because they had too many missing values, especially psycho-
logical variables and variables relating to childrearing, etc. 
Where a group of variables all relate to the same subject area, 
the redundant variables were either excluded, or closely related 
variables were combined into one. After this reduction, 91 variables 
remained for the factor analysis. These variables were normalized to 
unit variance. 
Missing data was a big problem because the factor analysis 
model has no standard way of dealing with missing data. Missing 
values were replaced with appropriate values for three of the variables 
in the manner explained above. The factor analysis was performed 
twice on the same data set, using two different methods for dealing 
with the remaining missing data: (1) replacement with the mean, (2) 
multiple imputation by the hot deck method with population density as 
auxiliary variable [51]. The second method typically gives higher 
variance and poorer correlation on variables with many missing values 
than the first method. 
The number of factors was chosen to be eight based on a Scree 
plot. Oblique rotation (Promax) was used in order to allow factors to be 
correlated. 
 
Structural equation modeling. In addition, study one 
comprised a structural equation model constructed with data from the 
standard cross-cultural sample. Several indicators related to intergroup 
war were combined into a war factor. The regality dimension was 
inserted as a latent variable based on the war factor and a number of 
cultural indicators according to the theory. The fast versus slow life 
history strategy dimension was also inserted as a latent variable based 
on internal and external war as well as other dangers and cultural 
indicators of life history strategy. Sexual moral was included as another 
latent variable because sexual behavior could not be directly observed. 
The influences of cultural regality and life history "fastness" on sexual 
morals are included in the model. 
Missing values were replaced with appropriate values for those 
variables where missingness correlated significantly with the factors in 
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the exploratory factor analysis and where the reason for data missing 
was clear, in the same way as for the factor analysis. Missing values 
were replaced by the mean for the remaining variables. 
Relevant variables according to the theory were inserted, but 
variables that failed to reach significance at the 0.05 level were 
removed. Unfortunately, most of the variables used by Quinlan [52] as 
indicators of parental investment failed to reach significance in the 
present model. A few variables that relate to parental investment 
remained as significant, while only one variable related to art and three 
variables related to religion remained as significant. The model was 
analyzed with the R package named lavaan [53], and additional 
correlations were calculated. 
 
Multiple correlation analysis. Also in study one, a 
simultaneous multiple correlation analysis was made for several 
variables according to the linear model 
v = k0 + k1 f1 + k2 f2 + k3 f3 + ε 
where v is any of the variables in the SCCS.  f1 represents 
cultural regality and f2 represents fastness of life history strategy, both 
obtained from the structural equation model. f3 is the population 
density, which was included in the model because it is a very likely 
confounding factor, according to the results of the factor analysis. k0, 
k1, k2 and k3 are coefficients, and ε is the residue of unexplained 
variance. The levels of significance for k1, k2, k3 ≠ 0 were calculated. 
Study two 
A subsample of fourteen of the cultures represented in the 
SCCS was selected for further study, and the desired data were extrac-
ted from the original ethnographic literature rather than from the SCCS 
database. This method was intended to reduce the problems with data 
quality and to obtain information that was not available in the SCCS. 
The extraction of data is further explained in the results section below. 
The literature listed as sources for the SCCS [54] was 
supplemented by any additional literature published later. All coding of 
data was done by the author. Every conscious effort was made to 
avoid expectation bias. No funding was available for hiring extra raters 
and test inter-rater reliability. A brief description of each society, an 
explanation of how it is evaluated, and the literature used, is provided 
in appendix1. 
Study two tests the prediction that certain environmental factors 
influence the level of intergroup conflict which in turn influences the 
social and cultural indicators that we associate with regal or kungic 
cultures. 
The statistical test uses a rank correlation. This is a non-
parametric test that makes no assumption about linear relationships or 
normal distribution, unlike the previous tests. Kendall's tau, τ, was 
calculated and the level of significance, p(τ), was calculated for the 




Exploratory factor analysis (study one) 
Regality theory predicts that the level of external conflicts and 
other collective dangers will influence a number of political, cultural and 
psychological variables. The fast versus slow life history theory predicts 
that both internal and external conflicts influence fertility and parental 
investment. We expect these two dimensions to be visible in a factor 
analysis because they have many cultural correlates. The factor analy-
sis is carried out twice, using two different methods for handling mis-
sing data, as explained above. The results are given in table 2 and 3, 
respectively. Detailed factor loadings are given in appendix 2, page 64. 
 
Table 2. Factor analysis of sociocultural variables in 186 societies. 
Factor interpretation % variance explained 
Political complexity and population density 7.9 
War 5.2 
Other conflict and violence 4.9 
Agriculture 4.1 
Urbanization 2.7 
Animal husbandry 2.6 
Fishing 2.1 
Gathering 1.9 
Missing data values are replaced by the mean 
 
 
Table 3. Factor analysis of sociocultural variables in 186 societies. 
Factor interpretation 
Occurren-








Political complexity and 
population density 25 9.8 0.9 
Climate 25 5.1 0.3 
War, conflict and violence 25 4.9 0.3 
Animal husbandry 25 3.3 0.7 
Gathering 24 2.0 0.3 
Fishing 23 2.8 0.9 
Urbanization 21 2.8 0.1 
Hunting 19 2.9 1.2 
Agriculture 11 3.6 0.8 
Uninterpreted 2 3.3 0.0 
Factor analysis on the same data as in table 2, but missing data values 
are replaced by multiple imputation in 25 runs. 
 
The first factor analysis (table 2) shows that political complexity 
is highly correlated with population density, and these variables 
combine to form the strongest factor. The second factor represents 
intergroup conflict as well as its correlates. This factor has high 
loadings on variables related to war, army and bellicosity. The third 
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factor has high loadings on both internal and external conflicts as well 
as individual violence. In other words, we have two factors that relate to 
conflict. These two conflict factors are both positively related to 
polygamy. Other indicators of life history strategy show only weak and 
inconsistent correlations with the two conflict factors. 
The two conflict factors merge into one in the second factor 
analysis (table 3). The difference between the results of the two factor 
analysis methods is a mathematical artifact. The method used in the 
second factor analysis has a higher tendency to form factors around 
variables with few missing values, which is seen e.g. in the formation of 
a factor of climate variables, which have no missing values. While the 
first method probably gives more accurate results, the second method 
is useful for estimating the inaccuracy due to missing data. 
It is noteworthy that the war factor is always distinct from 
population density and political complexity. This means that the level of 
war is not simply determined by population factors. The prediction that 
internal and external conflicts have different psychological and cultural 
effects gets weak support from the first factor analysis and none from 
the second. We must conclude that the factor analysis does not give as 
clear answers as we could wish, due to mathematical problems and 
poor data quality. 
A similar factor analysis made earlier by Russell found a war 
factor that correlates clearly with social hierarchy, slavery, polygyny, 
achievement and crime [1]. Interestingly, the war factor in Russell's 
study is also significantly correlated with a number of variables relating 
to sexual restrictiveness, tough treatment of children and early 
socialization. The correlation with religious variables is weak. An 
interesting finding in Russell's study is that people in warlike and 
hierarchical societies show a high level of boasting and display of 
wealth. The status competition and striving for wealth may lead to 
increased levels of theft and other crimes and conflicts [1], [55]. This 
finding may contribute to our understanding of the connection between 
external and internal conflicts. Another explanation is that boys are 
socialized for aggression in warlike societies [56]. 
Other studies have found that the level of intergroup conflict is 
positively correlated with harsh and punitive treatment of children and 
socialization for aggression [56] and moralizing religion [57]. Some of 
the predicted correlations have also been observed in modern cultures. 
Norris and Inglehart find that existential insecurity is linked with 
religiosity and high fertility [58], Carnagey and Anderson find increased 
pro-war attitudes [59], and Sipes finds a link with warlike sports [60]. 
A caveat is in place here when interpreting factor analysis 
results. The factors and factor loadings are quite sensitive to the design 
of the factor analysis, and in particular to the choice of variables 
included in the analysis. Other cross-cultural studies have found only 
weak correlations with a war factor, or no war factor at all [61], [62]. 
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Structural equation model (study one) 
 
The figure shows the influence of collective dangers and individual dangers on the cultural 
regality dimension and the life history strategy dimension, as well as the influence of both 
dimensions on sexual behavior. Rectangles indicate measured variables while ovals indicate 
latent variables. The directions of the arrows indicate the assumed dominating direction of 
causality, but the statistical results are insensitive to the directions of these arrows. It is 
impossible to distinguish between cause and effect with the available methods. Numbers on 
the arrows are path coefficients. Levels of significance are indicated as  *: p ≤ 0.05, **: p ≤ 
0.01, ***: p ≤ 0.001. (Measures of fit: RMSEA = 0.076, 90% C.I.: 0.067-0.084, SRMR = 0.091, 
CFI = 0.61, AIC =13782). 
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The structural equation model is shown in figure 1. This model is 
based on the theory that war and other collective dangers influence the 
level of regality while both collective dangers and individual dangers 
influence the life history strategy. Both factors influence sexual 
behavior. Various cultural indicators of regality and life history strategy 
are shown in the figure. 
The war factor emerges from the level of war and various 
indicators that we expect to be correlated with war. The results suggest 
that famine is a significant cause of war. The availability of efficient 
means of transportation (horses) appears to be a significant 
contributing factor as well. 
The war factor is significantly correlated with rewards for 
successful warriors. There are few variables relating to cowardice and 
desertion, and these variables show no significant correlation. The 
database has no variable indicating punishment for defection in war. 
Therefore, we have more support for the theory that attaches 
importance to the rewarding of brave warriors than the alternative 
theory that relies on the punishment of defectors only. 
The cultural regality is modeled here as a latent variable which 
is influenced by war and other collective dangers. However, the regality 
is also influenced by unmeasured factors such as cultural traditions 
and subjective beliefs about dangers, including religious beliefs. A 
number of cultural indicators of regality are included in the model, and 
it is confirmed that they fit into the model with highly significant path 
coefficients.  
The life history strategy is influenced by internal and external 
conflict as well as by other dangers. Only a few cultural indicators of life 
history strategy and parental investment are included in the model. 
Several other indicators of life history strategy have been excluded 
because they failed to give significant coefficients. 
Sexual morals are influenced by both the regality dimension and 
by the fast versus slow life history dimension, and reflected in various 
attitudes towards sexuality and marriage. No reliable measure of 
fertility was available, but we are assuming that strict sexual morals 
lead to high fertility. Our hypothesis is that strict sexual morals allow 
only reproductive sex within marriage, while sex for pleasure only is 
suppressed. This puts a pressure on young people to marry early and 
get many children because alternative outlets for their sex drive are 
blocked [67]. 
The results from the structural equation model confirm that 
cultural regality is connected with political stratification, caste 
stratification, despotism and slavery, and these results are highly 
significant. The connection with disciplining of children is weaker, but 
still statistically significant (p = 0.013). Few relevant variables relating 
to art are available, but the presence of large or impressive structures 
(large buildings, etc.) has a highly significant connection to cultural 
regality. Also, three variables relating to religion are significant. Finally, 
it is confirmed that sexual morals are influenced in the strict direction 
by both cultural regality and life history fastness. No direct path 
between regality and fastness was found. 
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Various correlation coefficients are given in table 4. The 
correlation between regality and fastness is moderate but highly 
significant (p = 7·10-4). Regality is also significantly correlated with 
population density and with various modes of subsistence. 
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients of selected variables against 
cultural regality, life history fastness and war 
Variable Regality Fastness War 
Regality  0.25*** 0.49*** 
Population density 0.52*** 0.11 0.20** 
Political integration 0.73*** 0.21** 0.43*** 
Urbanization 0.48*** 0.04 0.31*** 
Agriculture 0.41*** 0.13 0.15* 
Animal husbandry 0.43*** 0.09 0.17* 
Hunting -0.49*** -0.10 -0.09 
Gathering -0.50*** -0.13 -0.22** 
Fishing -0.25*** -0.11 -0.15* 
Warrior reward 0.10 0.12 0.58*** 
Warrior prestige 0.18* 0.15* 0.61*** 
*: p ≤ 0.05, **: p ≤ 0.01, ***: p ≤ 0.001. 
 
Multiple correlation analysis (study one) 
The results of the multiple correlation analysis are shown in 
table 5. There is a correlation of regality with agriculture, which 
disappears when population density is controlled for, as we can see 
when comparing table 4 and table 5, while the correlations of regality 
with other means of subsistence remain significant. The correlation of 
sexual morals with both regality and fastness remain significant when 
population density is controlled for. Polygamy is significantly related to 
fastness but, contrary to the expectation, not to cultural regality in this 
test. The expected correlation between regality and suicide was not 
found. The variable named classical religion is a mixture of very 
different religions and therefore not as specific as we would wish, but it 





Table 5. Multiple regression of various variables against regality, 
life history fastness and population density 
Variable Regality Fastness 
Population 
density 
Political integration 0.59*** 0.04 0.27*** 
Urbanization 0.26*** -0.07 0.46*** 
Agriculture 0.07 0.05 0.63*** 
Animal husbandry 0.47*** -0.01 -0.08 
Hunting -0.21** 0.01 -0.55*** 
Fishing -0.20* -0.06 -0.06 
Gathering -0.30*** -0.01 -0.37*** 
Sex morals 0.42*** 0.42*** -0.11 
Trend in autonomy 0.24** 0.02 0.19* 
Urbanization 0.26*** -0.07 0.46*** 
Class stratification 0.85*** -0.11** 0.04 
Caste stratification 0.52*** -0.08 -0.08 
Severity of famine 0.27** -0.03 -0.04 
Heritable slavery 0.63*** 0.00 -0.17* 
Polygamy -0.04 0.24** -0.13 
Suicide -0.01 0.38*** -0.09 
Formal sanctions 0.23** 0.10 0.14 
Horses 0.22* -0.12 -0.18* 
Classical religion -0.24** 0.10 -0.09 
High gods 0.41*** -0.05 -0.15 
Evil eye beliefs 0.55*** 0.03 -0.05 
*: p ≤ 0.05, **: p ≤ 0.01, ***: p ≤ 0.001. 
 
Subsample study (study two) 
Many of the cultural traits that we would like to test, especially 
those that belong to soft areas such as religion, sexuality, discipline, 
treatment of children, art, etc., are poorly represented in the standard 
cross-cultural sample. The relevant variables are either not included in 
the SCCS database or they are unreliable or have too many missing 
values. The data in the database are coded into simple categories and 
values that may be poor representations of the complex behaviors, 
beliefs and social structures in the cultures that we study. It is difficult 
to guess what the human realities that lie behind a number in a 
database are.  
First hand observation and collection of the missing data is no 
longer a possibility because the cultures in question have been heavily 
transformed by modernization if not completely annihilated or absorbed 
into modern cultures. We must resort to the original ethnographic 
literature and hope that we can find the missing data there. This has 
the advantage that the data are presented in a coherent and 
meaningful way. Therefore, it was decided to extract the relevant data 
from the original ethnographic literature for a subset of the cultures 
represented in the SCCS. The subsample was selected on the basis of 
the following criteria: 
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1. The selected cultures must be geographically, culturally and 
genetically distant from each other in order to avoid similarity 
due to cultural diffusion or common descent (Galton's problem). 
2. The cultures should be different in terms of subsistence ecology. 
Where several cultures resemble each other, only one is 
included. 
3. The population of each society must have lived in relative 
isolation long enough to develop a distinct culture. 
4. The influence from modern cultures must be minimal. 
5. The culture is not pacified by any colonial authority or other 
external power. 
6. The culture must be well described by more than one 
ethnographer. 
 
The subsample consists of fourteen cultures, which were 
selected for further study. The ethnographic literature for the selected 
cultures was studied in order to extract sociocultural information 
relevant to the theory. A number of cultural variables were evaluated in 
order to test if the correlations predicted by our theory could be 
confirmed. Details for each culture are described in appendix1. 
The different types of conflict, such as war, raiding and feuding, 
are often difficult to distinguish, and this is a serious problem for our 
testing of regality theory. Feuding is usually motivated by the desire to 
obtain justice by retaliating against the perpetrator of some wrongdoing 
or his family. This takes place mostly where there is no organized 
system of justice, which is typical for a kungic culture. Territorial war, 
on the other hand, is expected mainly in regal cultures, according to 
our theory. Any confusion between feuding and territorial war will thus 
tend to blur the statistics. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine 
whether the main motive behind a raid is retaliation, plundering, 
capturing women, or territorial expansion. For example, anthropologists 
cannot agree whether Yanomamo Indians fight over women, hunting 
territory or steel tools [68]. 
It was decided to use environmental, ecological and 
technological parameters, rather than the level of war, as the 
independent variable in order to avoid the difficulties in determining the 
level of war and distinguishing between different motives for conflict. A 
statistical correlation cannot distinguish between cause and effect, but 
it is probably reasonable to assume that the environment influences the 
culture more than the culture influences the environment, even when 
the available technology is included as an environmental factor. The 
semi-fixed status of available technology and ecological environment 
makes a statistics based on these factors less ambiguous in terms of 
distinguishing between cause and effect. 
Thus, the prediction we want to test is that environmental and 
technological factors that enable intergroup conflict are positively 
correlated with those sociocultural variables that indicate a regal 
culture, according to our theory. Other environmental factors that 
threaten a sociocultural group, such as unpredictable natural disasters, 
may also have an influence in the regal direction. 
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We are assuming that the following environmental and 
technological factors make intergroup conflict more likely: 
 
• An ecology and technology that enables a high food production 
per unit area, and thus a high population density 
• Neighbor groups with similar ecology competing for the same 
resources 
• Efficient means of transportation of warriors to enemy territory 
• Efficient means of communication over distance 
• Efficient means of food storage and transportation 
• Efficient weapons 
• Favorable climate 
 
Intergroup conflict is likely to be impeded or prevented when 
these factors are reversed, i.e. when food is sparsely distributed, when 
there are geographical barriers to travel, niche specialization, or when 
extreme climate conditions make work and fighting difficult. Our 
prediction is that a culture will be regal when these factors enable 
intergroup conflict and kungic when not. We will predict an intermediate 
level on the regality scale when some factors point in one direction and 
other factors point in the opposite direction. These assumptions do not 
hold in modern industrial societies where international economic 
interdependence or third party intervention often can prevent war. Also, 
the assumptions do not hold when the society is pacified by colonial 
rule or other foreign powers. This is the reason why pacified and 
modernized societies are excluded from our subsample. 
The expected conflict level is evaluated on a five point scale, 
where a 1 indicates that intergroup conflict is unlikely because of 
environmental factors or niche specialization, and a 5 indicates that 
environmental factors make large scale war possible. 
The following variables are evaluated for each culture in the 
subsample and correlated against the expected conflict level: 
 
War or intergroup conflict. The level of intergroup conflict is 
interpreted as the frequency, intensity, degree of violence and casualty 
rate of conflicts against other social groups that do not have the same 
self-defined ethnic or tribal identity. Territorial conflicts are given higher 
weight than plundering and retaliation of injustice. (Coded as 1 = none; 
2 = only small raids, feuds, vendettas; 4 = rare or low scale; 5 = 
frequent large wars). 
 
Internal conflicts and feuds. Internal or intragroup conflicts are 
conflicts between people with the same ethnic or tribal belonging. 
Examples are conflicts between families over properties or marriage, or 
conflicts between leaders and followers. Feuds are series of 
retaliations over real or alleged wrongdoing. The theory predicts that 
intergroup conflicts, but not necessarily internal conflicts, are positively 
correlated with regal indicators. (Coded as 1 = rare; 5 = frequent). 
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Political system. A hierarchical political system with strong 
centralized power is expected in a regal society. In a kungic society we 
will expect an egalitarian political system with little or no hierarchy, or in 
extreme cases no formal system of leadership at all. (Coded as 1 = 
none or simple; 2 = formal leadership; 4 = complex or varying; 5 = 
strong and highly hierarchical). 
 
Justice and punishment. We expect a strict justice system and 
harsh punishments in a regal society, but a mild or lenient degree of 
punishment in a kungic culture. (Coded as 1 = mild or lenient; 2 = 
somewhat mild; 4 = somewhat strict; 5 = very strict). 
 
Religion. We expect the religion in a regal society to support the 
power structure by mirroring or being part of the hierarchical political 
structure and by legitimizing or exalting the ruler. The religion in a regal 
culture often has a disciplining function by enforcing strict rules, 
possibly with supernatural punishments. The religion in a kungic culture 
is typically non-discriminatory and not connected with political power, 
discipline, elitism, dogmatism or strict rules. (Coded as 1 = mild, 
unorganized or non-authoritarian; 2 = religion supports politics; 4 = 
some disciplining; 5 = strict, legitimizes ruler). 
 
Group identity. We expect people to be hostile to strangers and 
have a strong sense of ethnic or tribal identity in a regal society. We 
expect less distinction between them and us in a kungic culture. 
(Coded as 1 = low; 3 = hostility to or fear of strangers; 5 = high). 
 
Fertility. We expect people to get more children in a regal than 
in a kungic society. Kungic cultures may keep the birth rate down by 
post-partum sexual taboos, long breastfeeding periods, anti-
contraceptive means, abortion or infanticide. (Coded as 1 = low; 3 = 
medium; 5 = high). 
 
Suicide. We expect the incidence of suicide to be higher in 
kungic than in regal cultures, according to [2]. This applies only to the 
types of suicide that Durkheim has labeled anomic and egoistic suicide 
[69], not to culturally prescribed suicide or self-sacrifice in battle. 
(Coded as 1 = rare or no mentioning; 3 = occurs; 5 = common). 
 
Sexual morals. We expect regal societies to have strict taboos 
and rules regulating sexual behavior, including bans on premarital and 
extramarital sex. Kungic societies are likely to be more tolerant of a 
variety of sexual behaviors. (Coded as 1 = lax, permissive; 3 = mixed 
or intermediate; 5 = strict). 
 
Marrying age. We expect the marrying age to be lower in regal 
than in kungic societies. The marrying age is recorded separately for 
men and women. Where the literature specifies a range for the 
marrying age, the median of this range is used in the statistics.  
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Divorce. We expect divorce to be easier and more tolerated in 
kungic than in regal societies. (Coded as 1 = rare, difficult; 3 = occurs; 
5 = easy, frequent). 
 
Children work. We expect children to work harder, and from an 
earlier age, in regal than in kungic societies. (Coded as 1 = no; 3 = 
some; 5 = much or early). 
 
Art. Different cultures produce different kinds of art. We are 
considering many different forms of art, including carving, painting, 
sculptures, decorated clothing, body adornment, architecture and other 
material art as well as poetry, tales, drama, music, singing and dance. 
We expect the artistic production of regal cultures to be highly 
embellished and perfectionist, possibly glorifying representatives or 
symbols of power. We expect kungic cultures to produce a more 
individualistic art with less conformity. (Coded as 1 = simple, 
individualistic; 3 = somewhat embellished; 5 = embellished, repetitive, 
stylized). 
 
The evaluation of these variables for the fourteen societies is 
summarized in table 6. Most variables are evaluated on a scale from 1 
to 5, where intermediate values are not always used. A rank correlation 
of these variables against the predicted conflict level is also shown in 





Table 6. Rank correlation of various socio-cultural parameters against the 
expected conflict level for 14 non-industrial cultures 
Culture 
  E




ar or intergroup conflict 






























!Kung 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 26 15.5 5 1 1 
Gilyak 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 22.5 na 5 na 3 
Mbuti 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 18 16 5 1 1 
Yahgan 2 1 5 1 2 2 3 5 1 3 18 15 3 3 1 
Warao 2 4 1 1 1 4 3 5 1 1 21 19 3 3 1 
Andaman 2 4 5 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 20 18 1 3 1 
Arrernte 2 4 5 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 na na 3 1 1 
Yi 3 5 5 2 2 1 3 na 5 1 13 13 3 3 3 
Apache 4 4 5 1 5 4 na na 3 5 20 18.5 na na 3 
Somali 4 5 5 4 2 5 na na 1 5 21 16 5 5 3 
E De 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 1 3 na na 1 3 3 
Ganda 5 5 1 5 5 2 5 5 1 5 15.5 14 5 5 1 
Inca  5 5 1 5 5 5 na na 1 5 25 18 1 5 5 
Babyloni-
ans 5 5 1 5 5 5 na na 1 3 29 17 na 5 5 
τ   .81 -.14 .81 .75 .62 .74 .51 -.25 .64 -.05 .02 -.32 .74 .53 
p  .0005 .3 .0004 .0008 .005 .01 .075 .17 .004 .5 .5 .12 .003 .016 
Variables are indicated on a scale of 1 - 5 as described in the article, except for marrying age which is 
indicated by the median. τ = Kendall's tau, p = level of significance, one-tailed. na = data not available. 
 
 
Table 7. Rank correlation of various socio-cultural parameters against the 
expected conflict level for 15 non-industrial cultures 
Culture 
  E




ar or intergroup 
conflict 























Yanomamo 3 4 5 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 5 3 1 
τ  (14 cultures)  .81 -.14 .81 .75 .62 .74 .51 -.25 .64 -.32 .74 .53 
p  (14 cultures)  .0005 .3 .0004 .0008 .005 .01 .075 .17 .004 .12 .003 .016 
τ  (15 cultures)  .80 -.12 .78 .70 .59 .53 .50 -.23 .67 -.24 .75 .52 
p  (15 cultures)  .0003 .3 .0004 .001 .005 .04 .056 .18 .002 .19 .002 .015 




At the regal end of the scale we find empires like the 
Babylonians and the Incas, while we find isolated cultures like the 
Gilyak and niche cultures like the Mbuti pygmies and !Kung bushmen 
at the kungic end of the scale. 
The statistical results indicate that the level of intergroup conflict 
is strongly correlated with the environmental and technological 
parameters, thus confirming that environmental factors have a strong 
influence on the amount of war. The important difference between 
intergroup and intragroup conflict is confirmed by the finding of a 
slightly negative and non-significant correlation of internal conflict with 
the environmental factors. 
The political structure is strict and hierarchical in high conflict 
cultures, and simple or egalitarian in the low conflict cultures. This is 
confirmed by a strong and highly significant correlation. The 
expectations for a strict justice system, a strict and disciplining religion 
and a strong sense of group identity in high conflict cultures are also 
strongly confirmed. 
The fertility or population growth is higher in the high-conflict 
cultures, as expected, but the trend is not significant at the 0.05 level. 
The level of suicide shows a negative correlation, as expected, but not 
significant. Sexual morals are stricter in high-conflict cultures, as 
expected, and the trend is highly significant. The marrying age shows 
hardly any correlation at all. This may be explained by the very 
inaccurate data for marrying age (some cultures do not count years), 
and perhaps also by the dependence of marrying age on economic 
factors and educational level. Divorce is more difficult in high-conflict 
cultures, but the trend is not significant. Perhaps divorce is more 
common in polygamous relationships and this neutralizes the predicted 
effect of strict sexual morals in regal cultures. 
Children work more, or from an earlier age, in the high-conflict 
cultures. This result is as expected and highly significant. 
The prediction that art is more elaborate and embellished in 
high-conflict cultures than in peaceful cultures was confirmed, and this 
result is statistically significant. 
Search for exceptions to the theory 
One of the most powerful ways to test a scientific theory is to 
search for examples that appear to falsify the theory. In an attempt to 
find a non-industrial culture that does not fit the regal versus kungic 
culture theory, we have chosen the famous example of the Yanomamo 
living in the Amazon rain forest. These people have a reputation for 
being fierce and warlike despite geographical isolation and a relatively 
low population density. The Yanomamo were not included in the 
subsample of study two because the SCCS lists only a single author of 
literature for this culture, and because the Yanomamo are 
geographically and genetically close to the Warao, who were included 
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because of their unique niche. Several authors have studied the 
Yanomamo since the SCCS lists were compiled. We can therefore 
investigate the Yanomamo using the same methods and criteria that 
were used for the other cultures. This investigation is included at the 
end of appendix 1. 
The Yanomamo have a higher level of conflict than the Mbuti 
who live in a similar environment. However, their means of subsistence 
is different. The Yanomamo practice slash-and-burn agriculture while 
the Mbuti are hunters and gatherers who obtain agricultural products 
through barter with other peoples. The more efficient food production of 
the Yanomamo enables them to have larger village populations than 
the Mbuti and hence a more regal culture. Chagnon finds that the level 
of conflict among Yanomamo is higher in the lowlands where villages 
are large than in the highlands where villages are smaller due to 
ecological factors [70]. Thus, it appears that differences in village size 
can explain most, if not all, of the difference in conflict level between 
Mbuti and Yanomamo. Ferguson proposes that the Yanomamo are 
fierce because they fight over access to steel tools and other western 
products [68]. However, there is no reason why the Mbuti should not do 
the same. Another possible factor is that the Yanomamo make heavy 
use of hallucinogenic drugs which make them violent, and which may 
give them visions of dangerous spirits [71]. 
The level of intergroup conflict among the Yanomamo may be 
higher than expected, but other cultural indicators turn out to be more 
kungic than expected. Table 7 shows how the test statistics of table 6 
are influenced by addition of the Yanomamo culture. The level of 
significance becomes slightly higher on some parameters, and slightly 
lower on other parameters, but the overall picture is largely unchanged 
by the inclusion of this culture in the statistics. 
 
Summary of evidence 
To summarize, the findings from both study one and study two 
confirm that the level of intergroup conflict is correlated with several 
cultural variables, and the correlations are in the direction predicted by 
regality theory. These findings are in agreement with earlier studies [1], 
[55]. Study two confirms that the level of intergroup conflict, and thus 
the cultural regality level, is strongly influenced by environmental and 
technological variables in non-industrial and non-pacified societies. 
While the regality level is strongly connected with the political 
complexity and population density, it cannot be reduced to these 
factors alone. The factor analysis and the multiple correlation analysis 
indicate that significant effects remain when population density is 
controlled for. However, the subsample in study two is not big enough 
for controlling for the confounding influences of population density and 
life history strategy. 
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It is confirmed that a high level of intergroup conflict or collective 
danger is associated with a hierarchical political system with strict 
discipline and punishment and a strong sense of group identity. Such a 
system is likely to have strict sexual morals and a strict religion that 
legitimizes the political system and contributes to the disciplining of the 
people. The art produced by such a society is likely to be highly 
embellished and perfectionist. The absence of collective dangers leads 
to kungic cultures, which are typically peaceful, egalitarian and tolerant. 
The predicted correlations for fertility, marrying age, divorce rate and 
suicide rate were not statistically significant in the present study, 
perhaps because many data are missing or inaccurate. 
The missing data caused mathematical problems in the factor 
analysis and the structural equation model analysis. The various 
methods used for dealing with the missing data problem may have 
caused artifacts in the results. 
It must be emphasized that the statistical analyses applied in 
these studies cannot prove causality. The structural equation model is 
useful for testing if the proposed causal theory fits the data, but it does 
not rule out the existence of alternative models that fit the data equally 
well [72]. Many variables were removed from the structural equation 
model because they showed no significant effect. This removal of 
variables may have caused selection bias resulting in false 
significance. Ideally, the confirmatory test on the structural equation 
model should not use the same data set as the exploratory factor 
analysis. Unfortunately, no extra data set is available since the number 
of relatively independent cultures is limited. This is a general problem 
in cross-cultural research. 
Many previous studies have found effects of collective danger 
that are relevant to our theory. Table 8 lists some of these studies. All 
of these studies find correlates of collective danger that are in 
accordance with regality theory, though a few studies fail to find all the 
effects that we would predict. 
Schmitt and Pilcher recommend that theories of psychological 
adaptations should be evaluated by the breath of evidence and the 
depth of evidence [74]. The breath of evidence means the number of 
different forms of evidence, such as theoretical, psychological, cross-
cultural, etc. The depth of evidence means the quality of the evidence 
and methodological rigor. In the present situation, the support for 
regality theory is more broad than deep. We have theoretical support; 
lab experiments, natural experiments and correlation studies; 
individual-level psychological studies as well as cross-cultural studies 
of collective effects; and studies of modern as well as non-modern 
cultures. The evidence is not very deep, however. Several of the 
studies listed in table 8 are using non-representative samples, 
unrealistic manipulations of danger, and are measuring only short-term 
effects. The cited studies are based on other theories than the one 
discussed here, or no theory at all. We need similar studies based on 
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regality theory in order to make more detailed predictions that can be 
tested, including predictions that differ from alternative theories. The 
present study is relying on the best sample of non-modern cultures 
available to us, but the fact that these cultures no longer exist gives 
rise to serious methodological problems, as discussed above. We have 
proposed a theory of individual and collective responses to collective 
danger. Future research should test this theory in various different 
ways in order to further develop and possibly refine or modify the 
theory presented here. 
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Comparison with alternative theories 
The traditional way of promoting a new theory is to prove 
previous theories wrong. We do not believe that this naive form of 
falsificationism has been very fruitful in the social sciences [75]. While 
we believe that regality theory explains our findings better than 
alternative theories do, this does not mean that previous theories 
should be completely rejected. Previous theories may still contain 
some important insights that might be remodeled and combined with 
the new discoveries in a synthetic process that makes our knowledge 
evolve and expand its explanatory power. 
In the following sections we will look at various other theories 
that deal with some of the same phenomena as the present study, and 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. Hopefully, this 
process can lead to an expansion of our knowledge rather than just the 
replacement of one theory with another. 
 
Cultural selection theory 
The theory of fast versus slow life history strategies, also called 
biological r/K theory, is based on biological selection acting on gene 
populations [40]. A somewhat similar theory for cultural selection acting 
on culturally inherited memes [76] was proposed in 1997 [6]. 
A selfish meme complex can use different strategies for utilizing 
the resources of its hosts (the persons holding the memes) to produce 
either a high quantity or a high quality of cultural offspring. A cultural r-
strategy is a strategy where the meme complex makes its hosts spend 
a lot of resources on propagating their culture and beliefs to others. 
This is seen e.g. where the winning group in a war is imposing their 
culture and military strategy on the loosing group, and also where a 
religious sect is spending a lot of energy on winning new converts. The 
opposite is a cultural k-strategy (written with a small k), which allocates 
few resources to winning new hosts and more resources to making its 
hosts satisfied so that they will not choose competing memes [6]. This 
is typically seen in times of peace where ideals of individual freedom 
become more popular than ideals of patriotism and unity. 
This so-called cultural r/k theory predicts that the cultural r-
strategy will be most efficient in times of intergroup conflict while the 
cultural k-strategy will be most efficient where there is no culturally 
different neighbor group to compete with. Interestingly, the predictions 
of this cultural r/k theory are so similar to the predictions of the theory 
of a psychological desire for a strong leader in times of intergroup 
conflict, that any of these two theories would provide a logical 
explanation for the cultural effects found in the present study. 
Individual psychological responses are not captured by the 
present study, but the individual-level studies listed in table 8 give us 
reason to uphold the theory of a desire for a strong leader. We will 
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argue that psychological responses to intergroup conflict are likely to 
be much faster than cultural r/k selection, and therefore more effective, 
but the cultural r/k mechanism probably has at least some effect as 
well. For now, we will assume that there is a synergy between the two 
effects, perhaps as the result of some kind of gene/culture coevolution 
[77], and we will incorporate both mechanisms in our theory of regality. 
We will use the terms regal and kungic, regardless of which of the two 
mechanisms is strongest in each specific case. 
It must be noted that the analogy between biological r/K theory 
and cultural r/k theory is so weak and imperfect that it may be preferred 
to regard the connection between biological and cultural r/k strategies 
as a correlation rather than an analogy.  
 
Authoritarianism theory 
The psychological characteristics that we call regal have a 
striking similarity with the phenomenon that social psychologists call 
the authoritarian personality [78], and in fact many of the findings of the 
current study could possibly be explained with the theory of 
authoritarianism. 
A particularly useful version of authoritarianism theory 
distinguishes two measures called Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) [79], which are connected 
with certain characteristic worldviews. RWA is linked with the view of 
the world as a dangerous place and SDO is linked with the view of the 
world as a competitive jungle where might is right. RWA leads to social 
conformity and SDO leads to tough-mindedness, according to this 
theory, and both lead to negative attitudes towards outgroups [79], [80], 
[81], [82]. The RWA theory is particularly relevant here because the 
view of the world as a dangerous place in RWA theory can be regarded 
as almost equal to perceived collective danger in regality theory. The 
SDO theory may have some relevance for our study as well because it 
refers to a worldview that assumes social inequality, but some of the 
aspects of SDO theory seem to be inspired by a competitive market 
economy, which has little relevance for Paleolithic hunter-gatherer 
cultures. Several studies have found that authoritarianism and group 
cohesion are increased by threats to the social group as a whole, while 
threats to the individual have less such effect [4], [64], [83], [84].  
These theories are in good agreement with regality theory 
because they link social conformity, punitiveness and xenophobia to 
collective danger. Evidently, authoritarianism theory and regality theory 
are two different paradigms looking at the same phenomenon. None of 
our experimental findings are in disagreement with authoritarianism 
theory, but many of the predictions that were tested in our study would 
have been difficult to make from authoritarianism theory because it has 
more focus on individual psychology than on social and cultural 
structures. 
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Our main criticism of authoritarianism theory relates to its poor 
theoretical foundation. Authoritarianism theory has its roots in 
psychoanalytic theories, which are not falsifiable [85], though modern 
versions such as RWA and SDO theories have little or no connection to 
psychoanalysis. The theoretical model behind authoritarianism theory 
has limited empirical support, and the theory has often been criticized 
for political bias [81], [86], [87], [88]. The term right-wing authoritaria-
nism is ill chosen because of its inherent political bias, and also 
because the concept of right-wing ideology makes sense only in a 
certain cultural context. In fact, some studies have found the same kind 
of authoritarianism among communists who, by definition, must be 
called left wing [89]. 
While many authoritarianism theorists regard certain political 
ideologies as undesired psychological aberrations, regality theory sees 
the same ideologies as adaptive responses to perceived collective 
danger (or, at least, would-be adaptive in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptation). The evolutionary theory is less likely to lead 
to biased and ethnocentric thinking, and we should bear this in mind in 
our choice of terminology. While authoritarianism theory certainly 
needs revision and a change of terminology, it builds on a research 
tradition that has produced many interesting experimental results that 
may be valuable when reinterpreted in the light of regality theory. 
 
Other cultural theories 
Peter Turchin's theory of historical dynamics has some 
resemblance to regality theory [90], [91]. Turchin explains the rise and 
fall of empires by the historical observation that group solidarity, loyalty 
and military strength grows in a conflict zone between culturally 
different peoples, such as a frontier between farmers and nomadic 
pastoralists. Such a conflict zone can form the nucleus of a growing 
empire. 
The cohesive force decreases and the state or empire stops 
growing when the borders are far removed from the political center. 
Turchin's theory resembles the explanation of the rise and fall of 
empires in regality theory [2]. The main weakness of Turchin's theory is 
that his concept of solidarity or cohesive force is poorly defined and it is 
not very clear how it is generated. 
While Turchin's theory makes little sense in stateless cultures, a 
theory of Marc Howard Ross about cultures of conflict explicitly refers 
to non-industrial societies [92]. His hypothesis is that psycho-cultural 
dispositions for conflict and violence are formed through harsh 
childhood socialization and male gender identity conflict, and the 
targets for the aggressive tendencies can be either group-internal or 
-external depending on structural factors, which he calls cross-cutting 
ties. His finding of a correlation between harsh childrearing practices 
and violent conflict is actually in agreement with our experimental 
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findings, but there is disagreement about the direction of causality, 
which cannot be determined from the available statistical data. The 
idea that cross-cutting ties can mitigate conflicts is quite reasonable, 
but the hypothesis that internal and external conflicts form equivalent 
targets for an aggressive disposition is not in accordance with the 
findings of the present study, and the drive-discharge theory of 
violence has often been criticized [e.g. 60]. 
Ronald Inglehart reports on a number of surveys of the beliefs 
and values of people in 81 contemporary societies around the world 
[63], [93]. He found that most of the variance in cultural values can be 
expressed by two factors: (1) traditional versus secular-rational values 
and (2) survival versus self-expression values. The traditional values 
reflect the importance of religion, deference to authority, traditional 
families, moral standards, desire for a large number of children, and 
resistance against abortion. The survival values reflect traditional 
gender roles, hard work, confidence in government, and intolerance of 
deviants. Inglehart explains the traditional values on the first dimension 
by the need for collective action in complex agrarian societies, and the 
survival values on the second dimension by the need for physical 
security in terms of economy and health. Inglehart's findings may not 
be directly applicable to the data of the present study because his 
theory deals mainly with economic insecurity and health rather than 
with insecurity in connection with intergroup conflict, but they confirm 
our claim that collective danger is connected with a number of cultural 
variables. The fact that Inglehart's data have been factorized somewhat 
differently from the present study should be no big surprise to those 
familiar with the mathematics of factor analyses. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The predictions of our theories are generally confirmed by the 
present study. Regality theory predicts that a high level of conflict 
between ethnic groups and a high level of perceived collective danger 
will influence the social and cultural structure of a society in the 
direction called regal. Peace and security will make an influence in the 
opposite direction - kungic - as we have proposed to call it after the 
most extreme example of this type of culture in our study, the !Kung. 
(Previous literature uses the word kalyptic). Characteristic indicators of 
regal and kungic cultural tendencies are listed in table 1 (page 5). 
We have tested several predictions of regality theory on 
ethnographic data from non-industrial societies. These tests confirm 
that a high level of intergroup conflict makes the political system more 
hierarchical, makes the culture more punitive, makes the religiosity 
more strict, increases group identity, makes sexual morals more strict, 
makes children work more, and makes art more embellished, stylized 
and perfectionist. The predicted tendencies for fertility, marrying age, 
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divorce rate and suicide rate were not statistically significant. It was 
also confirmed that the level of intergroup conflict can be predicted 
from environmental and technological factors. The results were 
satisfactory despite methodological limitations and problems with data 
quality. 
We have compared regality theory with authoritarianism theory 
and various cultural theories and found that regality theory is the one 
that best explains the observed results. We prefer regality theory 
because of its sound theoretical basis and its ability to make 
predictions for a broad range of psychological, political and cultural 
variables. It is worth noting, however, that many relevant observations 
have been made in connection with other theories and these 
observations may be useful for further development of our theories. 
Regality theory sheds new light on the question of why people 
are fighting for their group rather than free riding, as simple Darwinian 
models would predict. Our finding that both reward and punishment are 
used for disciplining warriors is better explained by regality theory than 
by alternative theories. Punishment is difficult to explain by other 
theories if it is costly to deliver or if it leads to retaliation, and reward is 
even more difficult to explain by alternative theories. The opportunity to 
capture goods and women from the enemy is an automatic reward, 
according to some theories [14]. However, such a theory explains 
offensive fighting better than defensive fighting; and it is difficult to 
imagine how these and other kinds of rewards and punishments can be 
distributed and how a successful military strategy can be deployed, 
unless there is a powerful leader. Therefore, the theory that best 
explains the present observations is regality theory. By supporting a 
strong leader, the individual makes sure that no free riders benefit from 
his fighting. Either everybody fights or nobody fights. 
The regality dimension is only one dimension of personality and 
cultural ethos. This dimension depends on collective danger, according 
to the evolutionary explanation. Another interesting dimension is the 
fast versus slow life history strategy, which is influenced by both 
collective danger and individual danger. The connection between 
danger, fertility and parental investment that is predicted by life history 
theory is only weakly supported by the present study, but more 
convincingly supported by other studies, cited in the life history section 
above. The regality dimension and the fast versus slow life history 
dimension are significantly correlated and have similar effects on 
sexual behavior. But our study confirms that collective danger and 
individual danger have different effects on the social structure, as 
predicted. 
The arrows in the structural equation model of figure 1 should 
not mislead the reader to think that the causal relations are linear and 
unidirectional. In fact, many of the causal relations can be viewed as 
bidirectional or circular. While frequent wars make a culture more regal, 
a regal culture is also more likely to initiate or escalate a conflict. 
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Similarly, a high mortality will cause people to choose a fast life history 
strategy; and a fast life history strategy may cause overpopulation and 
consequently conflict and high mortality. The statistical analysis cannot 
detect circular causalities with static data, but a circular causal model 
can explain dynamic effects, such as the rise and fall of empires, as 
described by Fog [2]. 
Regality theory offers interesting contributions to the 
understanding of diverse aspects of individual psychology, including 
tolerance, punitiveness, sexual behavior and art preferences, as well 
as social-level phenomena such as morals, ideologies, religious power, 
political organization and international conflicts. The present study has 
looked only at social-level effects, not individual psychological 
reactions. Some of the predicted individual-level effects are confirmed 
by the studies listed in table 8, though more studies are needed to test 
these psychological reactions in connections with the specific 
predictions of regality theory. 
The present theory improves the possibilities for a scientific 
understanding of history based on environmental and technological 
factors and intergroup relations. Rather than explaining a war as 
caused by the whims of a particular bellicose leader, we can start to 
study why this leader was bellicose and, more importantly, why he had 
enough supporters to stay in power, or why the population did not 
overturn this despot and replace him with somebody more peaceful. 
Our theory describes some very basic psychological tendencies 
that we believe have arisen in a distant evolutionary past, but we 
should be cautious when applying this theory to modern societies. The 
theory does not fully account for the effects of the complex layers of 
culture that have later been added on top of the basic social structures. 
The modern society is very different from the more "primitive" cultures 
studied in the present article. Wars are no longer prevented by lack of 
food for the soldiers or geographic barriers to their travel, but by 
democratic structures, economic interdependence, military alliances, 
deterrence, third-party intervention and international peacekeeping 
efforts. War, or fear of war, still plays a role as a regalizing 
psychological factor in many parts of the world, but the frequency of 
international territorial wars is decreasing. However, there are other 
psychological factors that can make regal influences on modern 
cultures. Possible regalizing factors include economic crises, natural 
disasters and terrorism, as well as fear mongering in the mass media 
that make people perceive the world as more dangerous than it is [94], 
[95]. 
The beauty of regality theory lies in the fact that it can explain 
previously unrelated observations from very different fields of study 
with a single theoretical model, whereby it bridges the gap between 
different scientific disciplines such as evolutionary biology, individual 
psychology, social psychology, cultural studies and political history. 
Regality theory combined with the fast versus slow life history theory 
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has potential applications in many areas of science. The causal 
connection between perceived collective danger and a number of 
demographic, political, cultural and psychological variables gives the 
theory a valuable explanatory power and predictive power. With the 
growing focus on global issues such as peace, democracy, 
overpopulation and ecological balance, it is obvious that these theories 
have many important applications. Such applications are, however, 
outside the scope of the present article. 
Discussion forum 





Here follows a discussion and evaluation of each of the cultures 
in study two. 
Andamanese 
The Andamans is a group of islands in the Bay of Bengal, 
totaling 6400 km2. The islands are volcanic mountains with dense 
vegetation. The temperature is between 17 and 36 °C all year round. At 
the time of the first anthropological studies the islands were populated 
by twelve tribes of Negritos speaking different languages. They lived 
from hunting, fishing and gathering and had sufficient food at all times. 
Their only vehicles of transportation were canoes, which were used for 
fishing and traveling along the coasts of the islands. The canoes were 
unable to sail in open sea. The Andaman Islands have had very little 
contact with the surrounding world until the mid-nineteenth century 
[97], [98]. The Andamanese is one of the oldest and most isolated 
human populations outside of Africa [99]. 
Based on the geographic variables we would expect the 
Andamanese culture to be moderately kungic. The mountains and 
dense jungle make traveling on land very difficult and the available 
means of transportation by sea were insufficient for large-scale war. 
The natives had no knowledge of any people living more than 32 km 
away. The favorable climate and abundance of food can be expected 
to allow a moderately high population density, which would weigh in the 
regal direction. The possibility of natural disasters such as cyclones, 
volcanic eruptions and earthquakes might also have a limited regal 
influence, but the mountains would offer some protection, at least 
against the cyclones.  
The frequency of warfare is listed in the standard cross-cultural 
sample as continual or once every 1 - 2 years. However, this listing is 
very misleading and due to a vague definition of war. There is no 
34 
evidence that large scale fighting has ever taken place on the Anda-
man Islands. The literature agrees that the only evidence of fights is of 
"brief and far from bloody skirmishes" where "only a handful of warriors 
were engaged on each side and rarely more than one or two were 
killed". These skirmishes were usually feuds between neighbor groups, 
belonging to the same or different tribes. The feuds may be ended after 
some time with a peace-making ceremony. No weapons of war have 
been found other than the bows and arrows used for hunting [97], [98]. 
While no evidence of large-scale war has been found, some 
inferences can be made. The many different tribes living in close 
proximity would quite possibly lead to conflicts over territory. One of the 
tribes, the Jarawa, who live on the South Andaman Island are believed 
to be invaders from the Little Andaman Island because their language 
is similar to that spoken on Little Andaman. It is possible that the 
Jarawa have taken territory from the original inhabitants in a more 
serious conflict in a long forgotten past. The Jarawa are in constant 
conflict with their neighbors. 
The remarkable fact that so many tribes have been able to 
coexist on a small area for as long time as it has taken to develop 
different languages is an indirect evidence that traveling was limited 
and that the Andaman tribes were willing to maintain peace and 
respect territorial boundaries, with the exception of the Jarawa. 
The Andamanese were hostile to foreigners and have 
systematically killed all shipwrecked sailors who entered their land. 
Especially the Jarawa were so hostile to foreigners that it has been 
impossible to study them. The Jarawa are surviving today for the very 
same reason, while most of the other tribes have perished after contact 
with modern settlers [100]. 
The Andamanese had no political organization above the local 
group. There were influential older men and women but no leaders with 
authority. There was no penal system, and neither children nor adults 
were punished for wrongdoing [97], [98]. 
The religious beliefs were fluid, flexible and incongruent. The 
Andamanese believed in spirits and other supernatural beings who 
control diseases, weather and other natural phenomena. E. H. Man 
has found several similarities with Christian beliefs [97], but these are 
convincingly refuted by Radcliffe-Brown as projections of his own faith 
[98]. All other observers agree that no supernatural beings ruled the 
Andamanese or punished their misdeeds in life or in the afterlife [98], 
[101], [102]. 
The relationships between neighbor tribes were friendly except 
in times of feuds and except with respect to the Jarawa. Intermarriages 
occurred as well as adoption of children across tribes.  
The fertility was low, possibly because children were breast-fed 
for three to four years. There was no birth control or infanticide. 
Mortality was high, and nobody became older than fifty years. Suicide 
was unknown. Children started to help their parents with various work 
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from about the age of ten. Children as well as adults played many 
games [97], [98]. 
The marrying age was approximately 16 - 20 years for women 
and 18 - 22 years for men. Betrothals in childhood occurred, but in 
most cases the young people were free to choose their spouse. There 
was no polygamy. Divorce was very rare. The sexual morals were lax. 
Premarital sex was almost universal, and adultery was frequent. 
Syphilis has spread fast [97], [98], [101], [103], [104]. 
Men and women had almost equal status and influence. 
Children were named before birth and the same names were used for 
boys and girls. The most important of their gods was described as 
female more often than as male. 
Their art was simple. They adorned themselves with necklaces, 
body paint and scars. The body painting consisted of simple patterns 
such as parallel lines or zigzag lines, with variations due to individual 
taste or changing fashions. The same adornments were used for men 
and women. Tools and canoes were decorated with similar painting or 
cuttings. Singing and dancing occurred on many occasions, often for 
ceremonial reasons. The songs were about everyday activities, not 
religion. Each singer had his own songs, while dancing was communal 
[97], [98], [101], [105]. 
The conclusion for the Andamanese is that most observations fit 
the expectations for a kungic culture. The observations regarding 
political organization, discipline, religion, fertility, sexual morals, 
marrying age, length of childhood, art and music are in agreement with 
a kungic culture. The absence of suicide, absence of divorce, and 
especially the hostility towards strangers point more in the regal 
direction. 
One explanation for the xenophobia of the Andamanese is their 
belief that dangerous spirits have a lighter skin color than themselves. 
They have regarded all light-skinned strangers as dangerous spirits 
[97]. However, this is just a proximate explanation with little theoretical 
value. The belief in dangerous light-skinned spirits is likely to have a 
historical origin in encounters with foreigners with firearms. And indeed, 
the history gives the Andamanese ample reason to fear foreigners. 
Malay and Arab slave traders, shipwrecked sailors, and European and 
Indian settlers have all treated the Andamanese with deadly violence 
[101], [106]; and the latest reports indicate that the violent 
confrontations with the Andamanese have continued until present time 
[100]. They have been friendly to foreigners in previous times 
according to some reports [101]. 
The frequent feuds between neighbor groups, whether they 
belonged to the same or to different tribes, are easily explained by the 
absence of any political system for resolving conflicts. The fact that the 
Jarawa appear to be more hostile than the other Andaman tribes has 




The Arrernte (Aranda, Arunta) tribe of Australian aborigines was 
a semi-nomadic people living in the desert-like areas near Alice 
Springs in central Australia. They had no means of transportation other 
than walking naked and barefoot. The few navigable rivers sometimes 
dried out and there was no timber suitable for making boats. The 
relatively flat land with sparse vegetation did not constitute any serious 
barriers to traveling, but the lack of efficient means for carrying water 
made it impossible to travel too far away from water resources except 
in occasional wet periods. The climate is dry with large variations in 
temperature. Day temperature can exceed 40 ºC and night temperature 
can go below the freezing point. They lived as hunters and gatherers 
and had no metals, no pottery and no efficient means for food storage 
[107], [108]. 
Based on this information, we can expect the culture to be fairly 
kungic because the population density must be low and because mass 
traveling was limited by lack of drinking water for the Arrernte as well 
as for the neighboring tribes. However, the droughts that appeared at 
unpredictable intervals constituted a significant collective danger that 
occasionally killed significant parts of the population. This may have 
pushed the culture somewhat in the regal direction. 
Large-scale war was absent at the time of the first studies, but 
war has reportedly been more common in earlier days before the 
spread of European diseases had decimated the population. Deadly 
clashes could occur when droughts forced people to migrate into 
enemy territory. The political structure was very simple. Decisions were 
taken by deliberation among the old men. Some men had leadership 
status but none had absolute power. There was no leader at the level 
of the whole tribe [107], [108], [109]. 
Men often beat their wives. Physical punishment was common 
and the death penalty was prescribed for several offences, including 
some rather trivial ones. The literature is not clear on how often the 
death penalty was actually executed in practice. Vendettas were very 
common. 
Beliefs in a life after death were weak or absent. Women 
became pregnant and gave birth as a result of totemic ancestors 
entering their body. The father played little or no role in this process, 
according to Arrernte beliefs. There was no supreme being ruling over 
the humans. Sickness, death and misfortune were blamed on taboo 
violations, evil spirits, and most commonly on magic performed by 
enemies. Witch doctors had some political influence but no strong 
power. There were many painful rituals. Many religious traditions and 
objects were monopolized by men and kept hidden from women and 
children [107], [108], [110]. 
People's identity was defined in terms of totem group and a 
complicated system of marriage classes. Tribal unity was not a strong 
factor. Foreigners were not allowed into their territory unless they had a 
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peaceful purpose such as negotiation or barter. However, there were 
often friendly relations between neighbor tribes and intertribal 
marriages were common [107], [108], [110]. 
The fertility was sufficiently low to keep the population size 
stable. Abortion was known and infanticide was common. Twins were 
always killed at birth. Suicide was unknown. Children were breastfed 
for several years [107], [111]. 
The Arrernte had little or no idea of biological fatherhood and 
consequently no notion of illegitimate children. A man might therefore 
lend his wife to other men for a number of reasons, with or without her 
consent. There were plenty of rituals and traditions that allowed, or 
even prescribed, extramarital sexual contacts in certain situations. 
Premarital sex, however, was generally not tolerated. Homosexuality 
has been reported for both men and women. Girls married around 
puberty, boys much later. Promises of marriage were often made for 
the expected future daughters of a woman, even before she got 
pregnant. Polygamy was common. Divorce occurred [107], [111]. 
Children were treated kindly and much time was devoted to 
them. Punishment of children is not mentioned in the literature [109]. 
Artistic expression was simple. Religious objects were embel-
lished with lines, dots, circles, etc. Body adornments included neck-
laces, nose piercing, scarification, etc. Objects adorned with feathers 
and paintings were used in ceremonies. There were songs and dances 
for many occasions, but only few and very simple music instruments. 
Marriage ceremonies were rather simple, while initiation ceremonies 
were more elaborate, especially for young men [107], [111]. 
The conclusion for the Arrernte is that most observations fit the 
expectations for a kungic culture. The political organization, religion, 
group identity, fertility, sexual behavior, treatment of children, and art 
are all as expected for a kungic culture. The possible occurrence of 
severe punishment, intolerance of strangers, absence of suicide, and 
the strong male dominance point more in the regal direction. The 
marrying age is low for girls but high for boys. The amount of war 
before the spread of European diseases is difficult to estimate. 
Babylonians 
The alluvial plains along the rivers of Euphrates and Tigris in 
what is now Iraq has been the seat of many city-states and empires 
that waxed and waned through many thousand years. We are 
considering only the period before the advent of monotheism, with the 
main focus on the era of king Hammurabi. The climate was dry and hot 
in the summer months and the temperature went below the freezing 
point in the winter. The fertile river plains were surrounded by desert. 
Boats of various sizes were available for transportation of goods and 
people along the rivers and the many canals that have been dug. For 
transportation on land, the Babylonians had donkeys, camels, horses 
and wheeled vehicles. Cuneiform writing was used for communication 
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over long distances. They practiced intensive agriculture with a well-
organized irrigation system. They had metals for tools and weapons 
[112], [113], [114]. 
There are strong regal factors here. Nothing hindered the 
mobility of the people. They had means for storing and transporting 
food and water, and they could travel far by land as well as on the 
rivers. The intensive agriculture could sustain a high population 
density, and the area that could be traveled was large enough for 
including multiple states that could wage war against each other with 
efficient weapons. The only kungic factors we can find are the hot 
climate in the summer, and the low population density in the 
surrounding desert. Since the regal factors are much stronger than the 
kungic factors, we can expect to find a rather regal culture here. 
The political system was a monarchy where the king was the 
supreme ruler, though the priests also had a considerable influence. 
The religion was polytheistic with a high number of gods and demons. 
Humans were created by gods for the sole purpose of doing service to 
these gods. Humans were thus servants of the gods, represented by 
the king. Humans were punished by the gods for their sins [114], [115]. 
War was frequent and the army was one of the most important 
institutions of the society. Armies numbered thousands of men, 
probably more than hundred thousands, and war casualties amounted 
to high numbers [115], [116]. 
Slavery and slave trade was widespread. A man could be 
reduced to slavery if unable to pay a debt. Political and economic 
matter as well as marriage and divorce was regulated by a detailed set 
of laws, written by the king. Discipline was harsh. The law prescribed 
death penalty or mutilation for many common crimes. It is unknown 
whether the actual legal practice followed the laws or if law-breakers 
could get away with paying a fine. It is more certain that slaves and 
prisoners of war could be treated harshly, and there is ample evidence 
of torture [113], [114], [117]. 
The cuneiform scripts and other archaeological sources tell only 
little about the life of children. Children were set to work and subjected 
to strict discipline, but the presence of toys indicates that there was 
also time for play. Children could be lent out as slaves for three years, 
perhaps longer, in order to pay their father's debt [112], [113], [114], 
[116], [118]. 
Little is known about the fertility of the Babylonians. On average, 
between two and four children per family survived into adulthood. The 
marrying age has been estimated to 14 - 20 for women and 26 - 32 for 
men, though these estimates are uncertain. The sexual morals gave 
men more freedom than women. Girls were supposed to marry as 
virgins. Adultery between a married woman and a man was punished 
by drowning both, according to the law, while a man was free to have 
concubines and to visit prostitutes. Prostitution was widespread and 
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regulated by law and by religion. Homosexuality was tolerated [113], 
[114], [118], [119]. 
Babylon had a large production of art, mainly under the 
patronage of the state and the priesthood. The numerous temples and 
palaces were highly embellished with bas-relief and monuments 
glorifying gods and kings. Favorite motives were royal hunting scenes 
and battle scenes, supplemented with stylized religious symbols. 
Geometric patterns reflecting a horror vacui tendency were common 
embellishments. Likewise, song, poetry and literature often glorified 
gods and kings [112], [113], [116], [117], [120]. 
The conclusion for the Babylonian culture is that the political 
organization, the discipline, the religion, the treatment of children, and 
the art all show typical regal characteristics. The sexual morals are 
ambiguous. We have insufficient information about the fertility. 
Chiricahua Apache 
The Chiricahua Apache Indians originally lived in Southern 
Arizona and New Mexico. They belong to the Na-Dene language group 
having migrated from the Beringia later than the Amerind speakers 
[121]. The Apache had been displaced to reservations at the time of 
the anthropological studies. What is known about their original lifestyle 
is therefore based mainly on the recollections of old informants [122], 
[123], [124]. 
The environment included semiarid plains and mountains. The 
Indians lived a semi-nomadic lifestyle and they were able to travel far, 
especially since the acquisition of horses in the 17th century. 
We would expect a plains culture to be more regal than a 
mountain culture. The Apache culture is a mixture of these two [122]. 
The access to easy traveling on the plains and the possibility of simple 
communication by smoke signals makes war possible and likely. 
However, the relative scarcity of food sets a limit to the population 
density and to the scale of war. The maximal possible size of a war 
party was limited by the availability of food rather than by political 
factors [123]. We can therefore expect the culture to be moderately 
regal, though the scale of war is limited by the sparseness of food. 
The tribe was divided into four autonomous bands at peace with 
each other. The bands were divided into camps, and each camp might 
include several families. There were leaders at the camp level and the 
band level, but there was no leader of the whole tribe. Leadership was 
based on common recognition. While the position of leader was often 
inherited from father to son, it was not necessarily so. The leader was 
generally obeyed, especially in times of war, but his power was not 
absolute. An unpopular leader could always be replaced without 
violence [124], [125]. 
Discipline was strict, especially for children. Small children were 
strapped to a cradleboard where they could hardly move. Larger 
children were taught obedience, and they might be subjected to 
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physical punishment, including whipping, if their wrongdoing was 
severe. Adults were occasionally punished severely, especially for 
such crimes as marital infidelity or murder. Deviants were often 
accused of witchcraft. Suspected witches might be tortured until they 
confessed and then killed [122], [123], [124]. 
Religious practices and shamanism were based on individual 
revelations with no orthodox teaching. Everybody could have 
supernatural powers and perform magic rituals. People could 
specialize in different rituals for different purposes. There were many 
supernatural beings, but none of these had a supreme position. The 
supernatural beings were much involved in human affairs. They gave 
power, were prayed to, and they could punish people with sickness and 
misfortune, but there was no punishment in the afterlife. 
The most important ceremony was the girls' puberty rite. This 
was a very elaborate and expensive ceremony lasting for four days, 
where neighbors were invited for dancing and feasting. The initiation 
rite for boys was very different. The boy had to go as a novice on four 
raids or war expeditions before he was considered a man. He was 
trained to endure all kinds of hardship [122], [123], [124]. 
Raiding and war was an integrated part of Apache life. They 
were going on raiding expeditions to enemy tribes several times a year 
for the purpose of stealing horses and cattle or for avenging the deaths 
of lost warriors. They might take prisoners of war, who were tortured 
and killed. Captured boys might be adopted and raised to become 
warriors. Women were not captured [122], [123], [124], [125]. 
Girls married at age 18 or 19, boys a little older. Marriages were 
arranged, but in most cases in agreement with the wishes of the young 
people. Sororal polygyny was practiced. Children were breastfed for 
three years. No information is available on the fertility or birth rate. Birth 
control was practiced by supernatural means and occasionally by 
abortion or infanticide. Suicide occurred. 
Sexual morals were strict. Social contact between the sexes 
was limited. Nudity was not allowed, not even when no members of the 
opposite sex were present. Masturbation was unknown. Girls were 
guarded for chastity. There was more sexual freedom for divorced 
women and widows than for married women and unmarried girls.  
Art was elaborate. Clothing and utensils were decorated with 
colorful patterns or figures. Music and dance was used for ceremony 
as well as for social gathering. It was the girl who chose partner at 
social dances [122], [123], [124]. 
The conclusion for the Chiricahua Apache is that this culture 
shows a mixture of regal and kungic signs. The cultural importance of 
war, the strict discipline and the strict sexual morals are definitely regal 
signs. However, the political system was less hierarchic and dictatorial 
than one would expect for a regal culture. The low population density 
made it impossible to incorporate a large number of people under a 
single leader. Political leaders did not have absolute power, and there 
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were no religious authorities either. The realm of supernatural beings 
also lacked a supreme ruler. It seems, nevertheless, that the religion 
had a disciplining function in the sense that people feared supernatural 
punishment and witchcraft accusations. 
There is no reliable information about fertility or family size, but 
the fact that birth control was practiced or attempted seems to indicate 
that the population size was controlled by the availability of food as 
much as by war. On the other hand, the practice of capturing young 
boys from enemy tribes indicates a clear desire to raise as many 
warriors as possible. 
Art, body adornment and ceremonial paraphernalia were 
elaborate, embellished and so expensive, that this may be interpreted 
as a moderately regal sign. 
Conflicts with white settlers and the availability of horses since 
the 17th century has no doubt increased the possibilities for war and 
raids, but the earliest available historical sources seem to indicate that 
the Apache had frequent conflicts with other tribes before the arrival of 
Europeans [125]. 
E De (Rhadé) 
This is one of several tribes that live in the highlands of southern 
Vietnam. The present study will focus mainly on the time before 
colonization. The mountain environment consisted of forests, dense 
bush and grasslands. They grew rice and other crops using slash-and-
burn and shifting cultivation. Irrigation of rice fields was used only 
where the environment was favorable. They were herding buffaloes 
and several other animals, including a limited number of horses and 
elephants. They had tools of iron and other metals [126], [127], [128], 
[129]. 
The environment had many obstacles to travel, but given the 
availability of horses and elephants we would expect the E De people 
to travel far. An efficient means of travel combined with efficient food 
production makes us predict a regal culture. 
The E De people lived in villages consisting of several long-
houses. Each long-house was the home of a matrilineal group of up to 
300 people. The political level of integration has varied considerably. 
The villages have often been partially or fully autonomous under the 
leadership of a village chief. In some cases a group of several villages 
have formed a mini-state. In one period the E De paid tribute to the 
closely related Jarai tribe. The E De have been part of the Champa 
kingdom and paid tribute to the Champa king for a period of possibly 
several hundred years, although the Champa influence appears to 
have been very limited. Inter-village raids and wars were common 
[126], [127], [128]. 
The E De society was highly stratified. The village chief and 
other rich people were very powerful, while up to two thirds of the 
population lived in slavery or dept dependence [128]. 
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The justice system was based on a large set of orally 
transmitted laws. Prescribed punishments ranged from payment of 
fines and religious offerings to enslavement and rarely death. The 
animist religion supported the social stratification and the socially 
unequal justice system by the belief that wealth was sanctioned by the 
spirits and the belief that misdeeds must be expiated by expensive 
offerings to the spirits. Unable to pay for these offerings, many people 
ended up in the possibly life-long slavery-like conditions of dept 
dependence [128], [130]. 
Families typically had 5 - 6 children, and the population appears 
to have been growing. Infanticide was not allowed. Boys were married 
at age 16 or older, girls perhaps younger. Child marriage has been 
practiced in the past. Premarital sex was tolerated if the couple entered 
a secret marriage. The wedding ceremony was very simple. Extra-
marital sex might have been punished, but was often tolerated as long 
as it didn't have economic consequences. Polygyny was rare. Divorce 
was disapproved of. Children started helping their parents from age 7 - 
8 and work in the fields from age 10 - 13 [126], [127], [128], [130]. 
Little has been published about old E De art and music. 
Buildings and weaved clothes sometimes had rich ornamentation. Rich 
people collected jewelry, decorated gongs and other prestige items 
[128], [129]. 
Though the available data for pre-colonial E De are sparse, we 
can conclude that the cultural indicators are in accordance with a 
moderately regal culture, though not quite as regal as expected. 
Ganda 
The Ganda or Baganda is a Bantu people still living in the 
kingdom of Buganda comprising 50,000 km2 to the north and west of 
lake Victoria in East Africa. Buganda is now part of the state of 
Uganda. The environment consists of flat hills, savanna, swamps, 
rivers, lakes and forests with a height of 1000 - 1400 m above sea 
level. The position at equator provides a climate with only small 
seasonal variation. The average day temperature is between 25 and 28 
°C all year round. There are two rainy seasons a year and no 
completely dry season. 
The area of Buganda is very fertile and more suited for 
agriculture than the neighboring areas. The staple food was bananas 
or plantains, which were harvested all year round. Other crops were 
harvested twice a year. The diet was supplemented with protein from 
domestic animals, hunted game, fish and insects [131], [132]. 
The traditional Baganda had good roads that were traveled by 
foot. They had no wheeled vehicles and they did not use animals for 
work or transport. They had canoes for sailing the lakes and those of 
the rivers that were navigable. They used iron for making spearheads, 
hoes and other tools [132]. 
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Based on these facts, we can expect the culture to be regal. The 
population density was high due to the fact that they had plenty of food 
all year round. They were able to travel far through the savannah and 
grassy hills as well as on rivers and lakes. Their range of movement 
was limited, though, by their inability to build bridges across large 
swamps and rivers [132]. 
Buganda was the strongest military power in the region. Their 
power is generally attributed to the efficient production of plantains and 
to the availability of iron. They attacked and plundered the neighboring 
peoples on regular raids where they captured cattle, women and slaves 
and killed as many men as they could [131], [132]. 
The political system was a highly hierarchical system of chiefs 
headed by the all-powerful king. The king ordered large numbers of 
men to be killed. Some were killed for minor offenses, some were 
sacrificed to the gods, some were killed to honor the ancestor kings, 
but most of all, the king killed men just to confirm his power to kill. 
All crimes and signs of disloyalty were severely punished. Theft, 
disobedience, adultery and other crimes were punished by death, by 
cutting off a limb or by heavy fines. The fines were to be paid in 
barkcloth, goats, cows and women. The culprit might enslave himself 
or his relatives to pay the penalty. The question of guilt could be tried 
by a system of courts that might hear testimony and use divination, 
ordeals or torture to reach a verdict [132], [133]. 
The Baganda worshipped various gods, most of whom were 
spirits of men who had served previous kings well while they were 
alive. Dead kings were worshipped in almost the same way as gods, 
but the living king did not have god-status and he could be killed and 
overthrown by rival princes. Anthropologists have discussed who was 
most powerful, the king or the gods. The king, and nobody else, could 
punish the gods by killing their priests and plundering their temples. 
The gods, in turn, could punish the king with disease and misfortune. 
There appears to be no clear winner in this contest of power. Most of 
the time, however, the king made rich sacrifices to the gods, and the 
gods in turn supported the king and gave him advice through mediums. 
The gods did not punish undetected sins, but some sins led to 
automatic punishment. For example, a child would die if its father 
committed adultery during the breast-feeding period. There was no 
punishment in the afterlife, except for the belief that a person who had 
had a limb cut off as punishment would continue to be maimed in his 
afterlife or next incarnation [132], [133], [134], [135], [136]. 
The members of the kingdom were generally loyal and willingly 
sacrificed their lives in the frequent wars against neighboring peoples. 
In some cases, the hostility towards strangers was an obstacle to 
trade, but for the most they welcomed Arab traders [132], [137]. 
Polygamy was widespread. The later kings had hundreds of 
wives and concubines, perhaps thousands. High-ranking chiefs had 
many wives as well. Such a degree of polygamy was possible because 
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of a sex ratio of three women for every man. The surplus of women 
was due to the loss of men in war, the king's mass killings of men, and 
the capture of women in war. No fertility data are available for the 
period prior to the introduction of Christianity and the abandonment of 
polygamy in the late 19'th century. By the mid 20'th century the birth 
rate was three to four children per mother. The common opinion of the 
natives is that the fertility was higher in the old times, and this is in 
accordance with the few individual genealogies that have been 
reconstructed [132], [133], [138], [139]. Suicide was probably rare. The 
only reports of suicide refer to the motive of shame [132]. 
Girls married at age 13 or later, boys at 15-16. The marrying age 
increased after the introduction of Christianity. A man had the right to 
beat his wife and could even kill her with impunity. Divorce was 
relatively common, especially in connection with polygamy. Women 
were guarded carefully to preserve their chastity. It was a big shame 
for a girl to become pregnant before marriage. The punishment for 
adultery was severe, but even the risk of death penalty was apparently 
not sufficient for completely deterring this crime [132], [136], [137]. 
Babies were sometimes nursed by maids so that their mothers 
were free to work. Children were often placed with relatives or chiefs so 
that they could receive a stricter upbringing. Children were taught 
politeness, etiquette and cleanliness. Boys had time to play while they 
were herding animals, while girls spent their time making mats and 
baskets [132], [136], [137]. 
The Ganda had very little material culture. All that people 
needed was a grass hut to live in, barkcloth for clothing, and a few 
tools for harvesting and cooking. The early kings did not even have 
chairs to sit on. Palaces, temples and shrines were built of reed. 
Ganda art was more decorative than representational. High-
ranking persons had some decoration and pomp to signify their status, 
and religious artifacts were embellished. These decorations were 
typically made of plant material, cowry shells, ivory, and bird feathers. 
Such embellishments may have impressed the natives, but they were 
quite simple compared to other cultures. The Ganda had many 
different music instruments, but we do not have sufficient information 
for evaluating the degree of embellishment in Ganda music and dance 
[132], [133], [135], [137], [140]. 
The conclusion for the Ganda is that the observations regarding 
political system, discipline, religion, fertility, marriage, sexual morals, 
and length of childhood are in agreement with a regal culture.  
The prediction fails, however, on the question of art. Regal 
cultures typically make impressive pieces of art and architecture of 
durable materials. The Ganda culture has none of this. No royal or 
religious buildings, monuments or sculptures were made of stone, brick 
or metal. The fact that the art was non-naturalistic and the architecture 
perfectionist is in accordance with the theory, but it did not have the 
degree of embellishment that other regal cultures have. The low 
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sophistication of material art may be connected with the low 
sophistication of material culture in general. There appears to have 
been very little impetus to technological inventions because food was 
available everywhere for a minimum of work. 
The lack of highly embellished art makes one suspect that the 
extremely regal political system was not fully internalized in the 
psychology of the people. While most cultural indicators are relatively 
regal, they are not fully on the same level as the political system. There 
were songs about military events, but no systematic glorification of 
kings, heroes or gods in Ganda music and art. The religion supported 
the king by sanctioning the mass killings that his power depended on, 
but the disciplining function of the religion was less effective than what 
we have seen in other regal cultures [132], [134], [137]. It is worth 
noting that sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by kungic cultures 
because of the dense vegetation that impedes traveling and a climate 
that is too hot for hard work. As a regal enclave, the Ganda culture may 
not have been able to evolve a cultural ethos that is too far from the 
surrounding cultures. We can thus observe a mixture of typically 
African traits with typically regal traits. We may speculate that the king 
had to compensate for this slight discrepancy in his culture by 
consolidating his power with mass killings of his own men. 
Gilyak 
The Gilyak lived in east Siberia along the river Amur and on the 
Sakhalin Island. Their main means of subsistence was fishing. The 
climate was very cold in winter. The vegetation was primarily Taiga 
(primeval forest), which was difficult to penetrate. The means of 
transportation were limited to dog sleighs and snowshoes in the winter, 
and rowing boats in the summer. The boats were unable to sail on 
open sea [141], [142]. 
We can expect to find a kungic culture based on the fact that the 
means of transportation were too inefficient to make war likely and that 
the environment could not sustain a high population density. 
The Gilyak culture had a moderately high level of internal 
conflict, but no external wars. The Gilyak did not keep record of their 
own history and had no memories of any war. According to one source, 
there has probably been a conflict between the Gilyak that lived along 
Amur and those that lived on Sakhalin, as well as a conflict with the 
Russians. However, no solid information about these conflicts is 
available. Internal conflicts were relatively common. The main reason 
for such conflicts was rivalry over women [141], [142]. 
The Gilyak had no political system at all beyond the family or 
clan. There was no chief or ruler. Common decisions, if necessary, 
were taken through deliberations where the most respected men had 
the most influence. Sources of respect were high age and experience, 
as well as wealth and bravery. There was no formal system of policing, 
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and punishments for wrongdoing were generally mild. Corporal 
punishment and capital punishment were rare [141], [142]. 
The religion was mainly based on beliefs in spirits and animals. 
There was no orthodox teaching, and not even the shamans were able 
to explain their beliefs in the level of detail that the explorers expected. 
The prophecies and teachings of the shamans were readily disputed or 
doubted. The Gilyak had a weak concept of a good god that they may 
have learned from Buddhists or Christians, but they did not pray, and 
this belief was completely void of influence on their daily life. There was 
no opposition to other religions. Some Gilyak even worshiped a few 
church bells that they had found as well as the ruin of an old Buddhist 
temple [141], [142]. 
The Gilyak had no word for their own tribe other than the word 
for humans. The name Gilyak is used only when talking with foreigners. 
They had regular barter trade with the Chinese, Japanese and 
Russians. The Gilyak were highly tolerant of foreigners and readily 
mixed with the neighbor tribes. 
The fertility rate was consistently described as low, but there are 
no accurate accounts beyond the observation that there were no child-
rich families. Children were breastfed for 2 - 5 years. Suicide is often 
mentioned in the literature on the Gilyak. No specific rates can be 
inferred, but at least it seems safe to conclude that the suicide rate was 
not low [141], [142]. 
The literature contains discrepant accounts of the sexual morals 
of the Gilyak. Schrenck characterizes the sexual morals as strict [141], 
while Seeland describes them as fairly lax [142], and Sternberg tells 
that the Gilyak were quite promiscuous [143]. We must recognize that 
sexual behavior is particularly difficult to study. There may be 
considerable differences between what people say and what they do. 
Sternberg's accounts are quite detailed and appear to be the most 
reliable. Schrenck mentions the sexual morals only briefly while he is 
more concerned with describing physical objects. Apparently, Schrenck 
has been unable to penetrate through the initial facade of modesty, 
which Sternberg has described. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude 
that the sexual morals of the Gilyak were quite lax. The marrying age 
was quite variable. 23 - 25 year old bachelors were commonly seen, 
but child marriages have also been reported. Divorce was easy. 
The Gilyak produced very little art. The most common product of 
art was small religious figures carved in wood. These wooden figures 
were quite simple and could be made by any member of the tribe. 
Women's clothes were often embellished with small brass plates and 
other adornments. Knives and other tools were sometimes embellished 
with inlaid pieces of brass, copper or silver. These adornments were 
used as signs of wealth. Music instruments were very primitive. Songs 
were simple and often improvised. It was quite common that each 
singer had his own song. Dance has not been observed, except for 
shamanic acts [141], [142]. 
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The conclusion for the Gilyak is that the culture was quite 
kungic, in accordance with the geography, climate and transportation 
means. The predictions for a kungic culture are in excellent agreement 
with the observations of level of external conflict, political system, 
discipline, religion, tribal identification, tolerance of foreigners, fertility 
rate, suicide rate, sexual morals, art and music. The occurrence of 
child marriages is in disagreement with the expectation of a high 
marrying age. The amount of adornment on clothes and tools is 
somewhat higher than expected. This adornment served the need to 
display wealth, which was an important source of political influence. 
Inca 
The Inca Empire had its center in the town of Cuzco in the 
Andes Mountains. During the last hundred years prior to the Spanish 
conquest in 1533 the empire grew fast to reach the size of several 
million km2, stretching from present Ecuador to Chile and part of 
Argentina. This vast area covered a wide variety of environments, 
including coastal areas, mountain plateaus, deserts and rain forest. 
The day temperature in the Cuzco area was 21 - 22 °C all year round, 
while night temperature occasionally fell below the freezing point. 
There are plenty of rivers running down the mountains, but these are 
not navigable [144], [145], [146]. Transportation by boat was possible 
only along the coast and in the lakes. The territory was connected by 
an elaborate system of roads totaling at least 23,000 km, and probably 
more. Relay runners were placed along major roads for fast 
communication. The Incas had llamas for transportation of goods, but 
no animals capable of carrying humans were available. Wheeled 
vehicles were not available [145], [146], [147]. Agriculture and animal 
husbandry has been practiced in the mountain plains and basins for 
3000 - 4000 years. Terraces and large irrigation systems were built to 
intensify agricultural production [145], [148]. 
Based on the geography alone, we would not expect to find a 
regal culture in the Andes Mountains because of the many barriers to 
travel. However, knowing that water for irrigation, efficient food 
production technology and communication technology were available, 
the prediction is a different one. The main crops - quinoa, potatoes, 
maize, beans, etc. - provided highly nutritious and storable food in high 
yields. The environment and available technology therefore provided all 
the factors necessary for developing a highly regal culture: efficient 
food production for sustaining a high population density, efficient 
transportation and communication, a climate that was suitable for hard 
work, and highly different environments leading to trade and wars 
between different cultures and different life styles. 
The political system of the Inca Empire was highly centralized. 
Everything was planned and controlled by a large bureaucratic system. 
People had hardly any choice about where to live and what kind of 
work to do. At the same time, the administration took great care to 
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make sure everybody had what they needed. Discipline was strict and 
punishment was severe. The worst crimes were punished by the death 
of not only the culprit but his entire village [144], [145], [146], [149]. The 
religion justified the dictatorial rule by making the emperor a direct 
descendant of the sun. Rich sacrifices were made to the gods, 
occasionally including the sacrifice of humans [145], [150], [151]. 
Sinners were punished in the afterlife in a hell. Suspected witches 
might be tortured to confession and killed. Religious ceremonies were 
plentiful and more pompous than puberty rites, marriages and burials 
[146], [149], [150]. 
The Inca rule did not enforce total cultural uniformity but they 
moved conquered people around to prevent rebellion. The different 
groups were allowed to maintain some of their cultural characteristics 
[145], [150]. 
Large families were desired but infant mortality was high. 
Abortion was known but illegal; other means of birth control were 
unknown. Infants were strapped to a cradle day and night and were 
breastfed only three times a day for one or two years. They were never 
held in the arms or on the laps of their mothers but were breastfed by 
their mothers bending over them. Larger children were confined to a 
hole dug in the ground. Children were required to contribute to 
household and agricultural work as soon as they were able to do so 
[144], [145], 146], 150]. 
Girls married at age 16 - 20 and boys in their mid-twenties. 
Some girls were selected for a religious life in celibacy or were given as 
rewards to high-ranking men. Most boys were probably able to choose 
their wife, but to stay unmarried was not an option [144], [146], [149], 
[150]. Polygamy was common among the nobility. Divorce from the first 
or principal wife was impossible, while divorce from secondary wives or 
concubines was easy. Trial marriages were possible in some areas, 
and the marriage ceremony made a distinction on whether the bride 
was a virgin or not. Except for the institution of trial marriages, 
fornication and all other sexual sins were severely punished [145], 
[149], [152]. 
Elaborate art was common. Festive and ceremonial clothes 
were finely woven and richly decorated. The decorations on cloth and 
pottery were typically highly repetitive with geometric patterns or 
stylized figures. Immense riches of gold and silver added to the glory of 
the empire [144], [145], [146], [150]. 
The conclusion for the Inca Empire is that the observations 
regarding political system, discipline, religion, fertility, sexual morals, 
length of childhood, and art are in agreement with a highly regal 
culture. We have found no mentioning of suicide in the literature, 
except in connection with war. The marrying age did not differ markedly 
from that in kungic cultures. 
The observation that the Inca empire could grow only because 
of the elaborate road system and the intensive agriculture begs the 
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question: Was the empire built because they had good roads and 
efficient food production, or did they build roads and irrigation systems 
because the power of the empire enabled them to do so? The answer 
is, of course, that the causality went both ways in a self-amplifying 
process. The area is more suited for a sedentary life than for 
nomadism, and the population has had sufficient time for developing an 
advanced agriculture and a relatively high population density. The 
availability of water for irrigation and efficient crops like potatoes and 
maize were also important factors. The first regal developments may 
have taken place in the coastal areas where the ocean provided ample 
food and means of transportation. There has been trade as well as 
frequent wars between the coastal people and the mountain people for 
centuries. Numerous chiefdoms and kingdoms have waxed and waned 
at the coast as well as in the mountains for more than a thousand 
years before the Inca empire flourished [146], [149], [150]. Regality 
theory predicts that empires will collapse when they have reached the 
maximum manageable size [2], which is indeed what appears to have 
happened several times in this area. Each new empire may have 
grown bigger than the previous ones due to improved technology or 
political skills. The Inca empire, too, was probably at the verge of 
collapsing at the time it was conquered by the Spanish empire 146. 
!Kung 
The !Kung Bushmen, also called San, have lived in the Kalahari 
desert of southern Africa for many thousand years, representing one of 
the oldest living human races [153]. The Kalahari desert is dry during 
large parts of the year. The !Kung depended on a few permanent water 
holes and on water-containing roots and melons during the dry season. 
They traveled long distances on foot and had no more possessions 
than they could carry. No other means of transportation were part of 
!Kung tradition. 
Our theory predicts that the !Kung culture must be kungic 
because the low population density, lack of water, and lack of efficient 
means of transportation make war impossible. The neighboring tribes 
had no desire to conquer their land because it was unsuitable for 
herding and agriculture. The !Kung have adapted to the dry climate and 
were able survive the frequent droughts without starving. At the time of 
the first studies (1950's and 60's) they were happily unaware that their 
entire culture was threatened and that Bushmen in more fertile areas 
had been exterminated. The !Kung were not refugees expelled from 
other territories [154]. Had they been refugees they might have been 
more regal. 
The !Kung have never engaged in war. They would usually run 
away and hide if foreigners entered their territory. Internal conflicts 
were mostly resolved by splitting up social groups. The traditional 
means of subsistence was hunting and gathering. At the time of study, 
some !Kung had started to work for neighboring black farmers who 
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treated them well. Others worked for white farmers under slave-like 
conditions [154], [155]. 
The political organization of the !Kung is consistently described 
as fiercely egalitarian. There was no political unit beyond the individual 
settlements with fluid membership. Various observers disagree on 
whether settlements had chiefs. There was obviously some degree of 
leadership based on kinship, age, experience and personal qualities 
[154], [155], [156]. 
Sharing was very important in !Kung life. Anybody who had food 
was required to share with others. Hunting tools, clothes and other 
possessions circulated widely through systematic gift exchange. Any 
attempt at boasting, self-promotion or accumulation of wealth was 
despised and effectively prevented through social pressure. 
There was no formal system of justice and punishment. Even 
the worst cases of wrongdoing could go unpunished for children as well 
as for adults. Theft did not occur. Murder was occasionally retaliated - 
in most cases as an outburst of rage, but in a few cases in a planned 
way. Severe conflicts were more likely to result in the social group 
splitting up than in any kind of disciplining. The most severe 
punishment described by the observers was that somebody sang a 
song about the misdeeds of the culprit. The need for social acceptance 
was sufficient to keep people in line. When the first schools were set up 
in the area, the Bushmen did not accept the fact that corporal 
punishment was practiced in the schools [154], [155], [156], [157]. 
The Bushman beliefs were fluid, ambiguous and incoherent. 
They had no clear distinction between natural and supernatural, 
between human and divine, or between human and animal. Their 
legends included traces of Bantu religion, Christianity, and even 
European fairy tales. Several observers have equated the most 
powerful of their mythological characters, the creator of everything, with 
the Christian God. But this god had few similarities with the monotheist 
God. He has been, in a mythological past, a vulgar trickster displaying 
all the immoral behaviors that humans abhor. The gods and spirits 
interacted with humans in good and bad ways, but were not concerned 
with upholding human morality. Rather, they manipulated humans for 
their own obscure purposes. The religious beliefs were used in 
storytelling, in the use of oracle discs, and in trance dances and 
healing. The exercise of these rituals was not monopolized by any 
religious authorities, although some people were obviously better 
healers than others [158], [155], [159], [160], [161]. 
Anthropologists disagree on what to call the !Kung because they 
had no clear name for their own tribe or race. They did not recognize 
others that spoke the same language as tribe fellows. They readily 
mingled with neighboring people of different races and worked for 
them. Mixed marriages were common [155]. 
The fertility of the hunting and gathering !Kung was so low that 
overpopulation was avoided and the natural resources were not over-
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exploited [154], [162]. Children were breastfed for 3 - 4 years, and birth 
spacing was 3 - 5 years. Infanticide occurred at a reported rate of 1 - 2 
%. No other means of birth control was used. Children did not work but 
were free to play all day. The average marrying age was 14 - 17 years 
for women and 22 - 30 years for men according to some observers, but 
child marriages are also reported to have been common. Polygamy 
occurred, and a single case of polyandry has been reported in a 
neighbor tribe. Divorce was easy. Suicide was rare [154], [155], [156], 
[161], [162]. 
The frequency of premarital and extramarital sex is difficult to 
estimate. Marshall reports that illegitimate sex was rare because it was 
impossible to hide, but she also notes that spouse swapping was 
allowed [156]. Guenther notes that their marriages were "loose" [158], 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt writes that they were fairly liberal in sexual matters, but 
open promiscuity was not tolerated [163]. Silberbauer reports for a 
neighbor tribe that people often could get away with adultery [162]. Lee 
reports that gonorrhea was spreading fast [154]. Rape was rare.  
The !Kung rarely produced pictorial art because it didn't fit into 
their nomadic lifestyle. The main art forms were song, dance and story 
telling. Women and girls decorated themselves lavishly with strings of 
beads. Men were tattooed as an element of hunting magic. They used 
bows as music instruments. Other simple music instruments have been 
introduced during the twentieth century. They appreciated individual 
inventiveness in art, and readily borrowed elements of art from 
neighbor cultures. There were no big ceremonies, not even at marriage 
or burial. The most important socially unifying ceremony was the 
frequent trance dance [158], [156], [161]. 
The conclusions for the !Kung are that the culture was very 
kungic, in accordance with the geography, lack of efficient 
transportation means, and niche specialization that prevented territorial 
conflicts with neighbor tribes during the times of early observations. 
The predictions for a kungic culture are in excellent agreement with the 
observations of a low level of conflict, an egalitarian political system, 
lax discipline, non-authoritarian religion, low degree of group 
identification, tolerance of foreigners, low fertility rate, long childhood, 
and flexible art and music. The expected high suicide rate has not been 
found. The sexual morals appear to be fairly liberal for a people without 
birth control. 
The fertility has recently been increasing and the egalitarian 
ideals decreasing for those !Kung who have changed to a settled life 
style among the blacks based on herding or farming, as can be 
expected from our theory. It should be noted, however, that these 
changes can be explained without using this theory [154], [157], [164]. 
Previous literature uses the word kalyptic for the opposite of 
regal [6]. As this word sounds somewhat awkward and may be 
misinterpreted as an abbreviation of apocalyptic, we decided to replace 
it with the new term kungic in commemoration of the !Kung culture. 
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There is no circular reasoning in the observation that !Kung culture is 
kungic, as the decision to use this term was made post factum.  
Mbuti 
Mbuti is a name for several groups of pygmies who lived in the 
Ituri forest, a tropical rain forest in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
near the Equator. The average day temperature was around 27 °C all 
year round. It was possible to pass through most parts of the forest by 
foot because of limited undergrowth. Rivers and swamps formed 
barriers to the movement of the Mbuti, who did not make boats. The 
Mbuti were nomads with a peculiar lifestyle alternating between two 
different cultures. For periods of several months they lived in the forest 
where hunting and gathering formed their subsistence. At certain times 
of the year they lived near villages at the edge of the forest where they 
traded meat for vegetables and tools with slash-and-burn 
agriculturalists of Bantu and Sudanese origins. The villagers had bound 
the Mbuti into a kind of serfdom, which was inherited on both sides - at 
least in the imagination of the villagers. However, the Mbuti could 
easily escape and change their allegiance because the villagers were 
afraid to enter the forest. The relationship between Mbuti and 
agriculturalists has lasted for so long that the Mbuti have lost their 
original language, but not their genetic uniqueness [165], [166], [167], 
[171], [172]. The only evidence that the pygmies have ever lived 
independently in the forest is archeological [173], [174], [175]. 
To make a regality prediction for the Mbuti, we first note that the 
population density in the forest was low. Walking through the forest 
was slow and there were rivers that the Mbuti could not cross. The 
environment was healthy and dangers were few. The forest provided 
good protection from the villagers, who would never pursue the Mbuti 
into the forest. These are factors that point in the kungic direction. 
Other factors point in the regal direction: The nomadic lifestyle could 
lead to territorial conflicts. The territory of the Mbuti was shrinking as 
forest was converted to agricultural land. Furthermore, the Mbuti were 
under heavy influence of the village culture, which we would expect to 
be more regal than the forest culture. Nevertheless, we will expect the 
kungic factors to dominate because the Mbuti could escape any conflict 
with the villagers, who were unable to penetrate their niche. 
Consequently, the prediction is that the Mbuti culture would be 
moderately kungic. 
The Mbuti had very little political organization. Some people, 
mostly older men, took leading roles in the camps, but egalitarian 
principles were held in high regard and everybody had a say in 
discussions. Conflicts were handled collectively. Everybody in a camp 
was responsible for avoiding or stopping conflicts between camp 
members. Young bachelors sometimes played a key role in handling 
conflicts between the older married people by means of mockery and 
ridicule. Conflicts were diverted or dissolved into ridicule more often 
53 
than settled with a formal decision. Retaliation for wrongdoing was 
common, but organized punishment was very rare. Serious wrongdoing 
could lead to the flight or ostracism of the perpetrator, but the banished 
person might return after a few days of hiding in the forest where 
somebody had secretly brought him food. No case of permanent 
banishment is known [166], [169], [171], [172], [176], [177]. 
The Mbuti abhorred physical violence. They have been engaged 
by the villagers as scouts in wars with other tribes, but there is no 
evidence that the Mbuti have ever themselves been part in any war 
other than killing a few trespassers [169], [172], [176]. 
The religious beliefs of the Mbuti varied considerably and lacked 
precision and dogmas. Different observers disagree on even the most 
fundamental aspects of Mbuti beliefs, such as the names and nature of 
their supernatural beings, whether they prayed and sacrificed, 
witchcraft, and afterlife. The villagers involved the Mbuti in their rites of 
passage in an attempt to exercise supernatural control over them. The 
Mbuti willingly participated in these rituals and pretended to share the 
beliefs of the villagers, which they could use to their own advantage. 
The villagers believed that the forest was full of malevolent spirits, and 
the Mbuti actively worked to reinforce such beliefs among the villagers 
in order to keep them out of the forest. When no villager was watching 
them, the Mbuti would ridicule the beliefs of the villagers and 
deliberately violate the religious taboos of their villager hosts. When in 
the forest, the Mbuti had only few religious rituals. It is uncertain 
whether the Mbuti honestly believed in any form of supernatural 
punishment, but we can say with reasonable confidence that religion 
was not a strong disciplining force in Mbuti life [170], [171], [172]. 
Different Pygmy groups considered themselves as belonging to 
the same tribe, even if they spoke different languages (the languages 
of their respective village hosts). They did not allow trespassers. They 
were fearful but also friendly to foreigners and open to foreign cultural 
influences. They regarded the villages as hunting grounds and saw the 
villagers as "animals" to be exploited for their own advantage [169], 
[172]. 
Sexual morals were liberal among the Mbuti. Premarital 
intercourse was sanctioned in certain puberty rituals. Marital infidelity 
was not a rare occurrence, and divorce was easy. Polygamy occurred. 
They married after puberty with little or no ceremony. The average age 
of first marriage was 18 for boys, 16 for girls. The marriage was not 
considered fully established until the first child was born. [165], [169], 
[171], [172], [177].  
Children were breastfed for at least 1-3 years. Birth spacing was 
3-4 years. Birth control was obtained by a post-partum sex taboo, and 
probably by other unknown means. Abortion was known but rare. 
Infanticide was practiced after twin births. The fertility was low 
according to some accounts, higher according to others, but the total 
population size was stable. Suicide occurred [165], [167], [172], [173]. 
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Children were treated with affection. They had considerable 
freedom, were rarely punished, and did not have to do hard work [168], 
[169], [171]. 
The most important art forms were singing and dancing. The 
singing of the Mbuti and related Pygmy tribes is characterized as 
polyphonic. Everybody could join in or contribute in turns with possibly 
improvised harmonies in no predefined order and with no apparent 
hierarchy of voices. The result was a rich complexity of different voices 
to a common rhythm. The dance often formed mimicry of daily events. 
Erotic dances were also common. There was no graphic art other than 
simple body painting, body adornment and decoration of clothes [168], 
[171], [177], [178], [179]. 
We can conclude that Mbuti culture was even more kungic than 
expected. All the cultural indicators point in the kungic direction. The 
further away they were from village influence, the more peaceful and 
egalitarian was their behavior. 
Somali 
The Somali live in the northeast of Africa at the Gulf of Aden. 
The climate is dry with temperatures ranging from below the freezing 
point to above 40 ºC. Droughts occur at irregular intervals. The 
environment is mostly semiarid plains and plateaus with little 
vegetation. Most of the population lived as nomads and herders with 
milk as the staple food. There are only two permanent rivers in 
Somaliland. Agriculture with irrigation was practiced near the rivers. 
The coastal population lived of fishing, trade and crafts. There was 
extensive trade with Arabia and with other parts of Africa. 
The Somalis traveled around with camels and donkeys as pack 
animals. Lack of water was no big obstacle to traveling because the 
camels could go long distances without water, and because the 
herders could drink camel milk on their travels. The sparse grazing 
resources for the animals set a limit to the size of troops that could 
travel together. The most important weapons were iron-headed spears. 
Horses were used in battle if available, but there were only few horses 
[180], [181]. 
Based on this information, we can expect the culture of the 
Somalis to be moderately regal. The relative ease of travel and the 
availability of metal weapons are factors that point in the regal 
direction. The occurrence of droughts at unpredictable intervals may 
also be a regal factor. However, the population density must 
necessarily be low, except near the coast and the rivers. This points in 
the kungic direction. The low-density nomadic population could not 
easily be incorporated into a larger political or military organization. The 
hot and dry climate also limited the fighting ability of the population. 
Prior to European colonization, the political organization of the 
Somalis was fluid and ever changing. The political leader of a family, 
clan or tribe was chosen partly by majority decisions of the adult men, 
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partly by inheritance, and partly by power, influence and age. Higher-
level political structures were either absent or unstable. City-states and 
small sultanates were formed from time to time, but they often 
disintegrated again after some time. The political leader and the 
religious leader was seldom the same person. Arab immigrants had a 
high prestige and a considerable political and religious influence. 
Slavery has been very common. However, slaves were reportedly 
treated well and many slaves have been freed [180], [181], [182], [183]. 
War, feuds, raids and plundering were frequent occurrences. 
The wars were of a relatively low scale with at most a few hundred 
deaths, but it is assumed that the territorial boundaries were ultimately 
defined by military strength [181], [184]. 
The religious belief of the Somalis was dominated by Islam due 
to a strong Arabic influence. The religion was a strong power, 
especially in moral and judicial matters. Legal matters were governed 
mainly by Islamic Sharia law. Crimes were punished by the payment of 
a fine, for example 100 camels for homicide, which was paid partly by 
the offender and partly by his group. Other forms of punishment were 
rare [180], [181], [182]. 
The literature gives no reliable information on fertility and 
population growth. Children were breastfed for two years, but were also 
given other food. Child mortality was high. Children were set to work 
from an early age. Children were well disciplined, but there are no 
reports about punishment of children. The marrying age varied from 12 
to 20 for girls and between 17 and 25 for boys. Child betrothal and 
forced marriages occurred, but were not common. Men who could 
afford it practiced polygamy. The sexual morals were strict, except for 
the divorce rate, which was very high. Girls were infibulated to ensure 
chastity. Social contact between boys and girls was limited [180], [181], 
[183], [184], [185]. 
Pictorial art was not very important because of the nomadic 
lifestyle of the majority of the population. Clothing and body adornment 
was simple without excessive embellishments. Tools and objects were 
sometimes embellished with woodcarvings, showing simple figures and 
often repetitive geometric patterns. Dances were relatively simple, 
sometimes with a war theme. The most important art form was poetry, 
which was highly stylized and rule bound [180], [181], [183], [186]. 
The conclusion for the Somali is that the political organization is 
intermediate; the justice system and the relatively mild punishments 
can be characterized as kungic. The religion, the sexual morals, and 
the widespread slavery are more on the regal side. The artistic 
expressions show mixed characteristics, where especially the poetry 




The Warao Indians live mainly in the large delta of the Orinoco 
River in Venezuela, an area of approx. 18,000 km2. The environment is 
swamps, mangroves, tropical rain forest, and a labyrinthine system of 
rivers. The staple food was the sago-like pith of the Moriche palm, 
supplemented by fish and small animals. Food was plentiful, but 
seasonal. Food storing was practiced where necessary. In later times, 
the Warao have built their huts on stilts for protection against floods. 
They went everywhere by canoes. Their canoes were capable of 
sailing along the coast of Venezuela and to the nearby island of 
Trinidad, where they went for trading. Traveling over land was virtually 
impossible due to the dense forests, lack of dry ground, and many 
rivers. They had no pottery and no metal tools, except in later times 
where modern tools were obtained by trade [187], [188], [189]. 
Warao culture was adapted to a very specialized niche. No 
foreign tribe had the necessary skills to navigate the swampy delta, 
and much less to gather food and survive there. This gave the Warao 
good protection. Whenever the Warao were attacked by neighbor 
tribes, they found protection in the swamps and dense forests. 
We would expect the Warao to be able to attack neighbor tribes 
because of the ability to travel far in their canoes, although they lacked 
efficient weapons and the population density was low. However, they 
would have little incentive to leave the area that fitted their specialized 
niche and outsiders would have little reason to attack them. Hence, we 
can predict that the niche specialization gave the Warao a moderately 
kungic culture. 
The Warao were peaceful people who detested physical 
aggression. They were rarely involved in war, but there is evidence that 
they have been at war with neighbor Carib who allegedly cannibalized 
the Warao or sold them as slaves. There was no war between Warao 
subtribes. Internal conflicts were dealt with by public hearings or 
ritualized competitions; and territorial transgressions were prevented by 
(threats of) black magic [188], [190], [191], [192], [193]. 
The Warao were divided into subtribes. Each subtribe consisted 
of a number of bands, which were led by an elite of elders, patriarchs 
or chiefs, possibly including women. Shamans belonged to the elite, 
and chiefs were often shamans. There was only a loose organization of 
the subtribe and no political organization above the level of the subtribe 
[188], [189]. 
The political leaders had little power to discipline or coerce 
people. Shamans did, however, have considerable power because of 
their contact with spirits who could cause fortune or misfortune. The 
Warao believed in a supernatural world populated by spirits or deified 
ancestors. People were rewarded in the afterlife if they had been skilful 
at their work. There was no dogmatic system of beliefs [188], [189], 
[192], [194], [195]. 
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The Warao have traditionally avoided contact with other tribes, 
except for trade of necessary products. In modern times, however, they 
have intermarried with foreigners, adopted Spanish names, migrated, 
and accepted foreign culture elements quite quickly [188], [189]. 
The fertility was very high. A woman who survived into old age 
would get almost nine children on average. It must be mentioned, 
however, that this fertility rate was measured at a time when modern 
medicine had reduced the - previously very high - mortality, and where 
a large fraction of the population had settled into an agricultural 
lifestyle. It is possible that infectious diseases have stabilized the 
population size in earlier times. Children were breastfed for 3-4 years. 
Infanticide was practiced [189], [193]. 
Girls were usually married in their teens or early twenties; boys 
were a few years older when they married. A few girls were married as 
children. Polygyny occurred. Most marriages were within the same 
subtribe. Promiscuity was common in connection with certain rituals 
and dances. A man could have sex with the unmarried sister of his 
wife. Premarital trial unions were common. Divorce was rare for 
couples with several children [187], [188], [189], [192], [193], [196]. 
Children were treated well, and parents made toys for their 
children. Children spent most of their time playing, but they also helped 
with light work. Children were rarely scolded, and teenagers were not 
well disciplined [188], [190], [193]. 
Some religious artifacts were decorated, while tools, canoes and 
huts were rarely so. People wore necklaces and other adornment. The 
main forms of art were songs, dances and narratives. Singers had 
much freedom for variation and improvisation. Typical narratives were 
fables, stories about magical transformations, and stories about the 
supernatural world. There were no narratives or songs exalting 
powerful leaders, gods or battles; but there were tales about past 
invasions and a few fables told about jaguars that symbolized the 
enemy Carib. The main occasions for large social gatherings were 
religious ceremonies. Ceremonies for marriages and other rites of 
passage were not very elaborate [188], [194], [195], [196], [197]. 
The conclusion for the Warao is that the level of war, political 
system, discipline, treatment of children, sexual behavior and art were 
all in agreement with the predictions for a kungic culture. The religion 
was relatively kungic, though it did have a disciplining function. The 
fertility was atypically high. 
Yahgan 
The present study concerns the canoe Indians who lived in the 
southernmost part of South America, the Tierra del Fuego, with the 
main focus on the Yahgan tribe. The climate was harsh and cold, with 
frequent storms. The territory of the canoe Indians was an archipelago 
of islands with high mountains and dense forests. The land was difficult 
to penetrate and provided only very little vegetable food. Therefore, the 
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Indians lived as nomads traveling in bark canoes, eating mainly 
seafood. Their tools were made mainly of wood, bone and shells. They 
had no metals and no pottery. As they had very little clothes, they 
always kept a fire for keeping warm [198], [199], [200], [201], [202]. 
Fishing in this environment could sustain only a low population 
density. The Indians could travel from island to island in their bark 
canoes, but not in open sea. Large-scale war has probably been 
impossible because of the low population density and because the bark 
canoes were too small and fragile. Small-scale clashes were more 
likely to have taken place. If we have to make a prediction based on 
the geography and technology alone, we will expect the Yahgan culture 
to be moderately kungic. The niche culture, harsh climate, low 
population density, and absence of technology suitable for war are 
factors that point in the kungic direction. The ability to travel far, and 
the risk of territorial conflict that come with a nomadic lifestyle, are 
factors that point in the regal direction. 
The Yahgan had no social organization beyond the family. 
Several families might live together or meet for social and ceremonial 
occasions or to feast on a stranded whale, but there was no common 
leadership and no group organization. War was unknown, but small-
scale conflicts and feuds were common. Revenge was not always 
deadly. There were no weapons other than the usual hunting tools. 
There was no organized policing. Punishment occurred in the form of 
revenge from the wronged party assisted by his or her family, for 
example beating for marital infidelity. In most cases, however, public 
condemnation was sufficient for deterring undesired behavior [198], 
[200], [201], [202], [203], [204]. 
They had few religious activities other than rites of passage and 
a few ceremonies. Some sources say that they believed in a high god 
[200], [202], other sources deny this [205]. Medicine men worked to 
cure diseases by means of self-induced trance or dreams, but they had 
few or no religious paraphernalia; they did not sacrifice and they did not 
believe that supernatural beings could be influenced by prayer. They 
believed that diseases and death were punishments for wrongdoing. 
For this reason, we can say that the religion had at least some 
disciplining function [199], [200], [202], [205]. 
There were several tribes of canoe Indians with distinct tribal 
identities. They feared the neighboring Selk'nam, who lived on land 
rather than in canoes. They were surprisingly tolerant of Whites, 
considering that they have been treated very brutally by white sea-
farers, gold diggers and settlers in the past [198], [200], [201], [206]. 
There are no reliable data on the fertility of the Yahgan, and the 
sources do not fully agree. Some sources tell that they got many 
children, but the mortality was also high. The population size may have 
been stable for hundreds or thousands of years. The population has 
gone extinct after contact with Whites, mainly due to infectious 
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diseases. Abortion and infanticide was known. Suicide was unknown 
[200], [201], [202], [204]. 
There are conflicting accounts of the sexual morals of the 
Yahgan. They tried to keep boys and girls apart from each other, but 
premarital sex was nevertheless common. Extramarital sex occurred. 
The marrying age was reportedly around age 17-19 for boys and 15-16 
for girls, but these figures may be inaccurate since they didn't count 
their ages. Polygamy was rare in some areas; perhaps common in 
other areas. Authors disagree on whether divorce was frequent or rare 
[198], [200], [201], [202], [204], [205]. 
Children were treated with devotion. Weaning age was 3 years 
or more. Children were given miniature tools to play and practice with. 
Small children were never punished. Children were obedient and 
helped their parents with daily chores, but they were never forced to do 
hard work [200], [205]. 
Yahgan art was extremely simple. Body painting consisted of 
simple lines and dots without precision. There was little or no tattooing 
and body mutilation. Music consisted of just a few notes, sometimes 
only a single repeated note. There were no music instruments other 
than percussion. Dances were imitations of animals (Nordenskjöld 
mentions a war dance, but gives no detail [206]. His account appears 
to be unreliable). Legends were mostly fables, myths about culture 
heroes, and a few stories about revenge [200], [201], [202], [207]. 
The conclusion for the Yahgan is that the level of war, political 
system, discipline, treatment of children, and art are all in agreement 
with the predictions for a kungic culture. The religion was kungic, 
though it did have a disciplining function. The fertility was high. 
Yi (Lolo, Nuosu) 
The Yi people live in the large mountainous region of 
southwestern China. The present study is focused mainly on the 
subgroup living in the Liang Shan area and the period prior to the rise 
of communism in China. 
The climate is temperate, but winters are hard. The subsistence 
was based mainly on slash and burn agriculture and animal husbandry. 
Transportation was difficult because of the steep mountains. There 
were no roads except narrow footpaths. Roads built by Han-Chinese 
invaders were systematically destroyed to prevent invasion. The Yi 
used horses for transportation and in war, but many paths were difficult 
or impossible to travel by horse. Most traveling was done by walking 
barefoot. There were many rivers, but few were navigable. The 
weapons included bows and arrows, iron-headed spears and tridents, 
and in later times also primitive firearms [127], [208], [209], [210], [211], 
[212]. 
Attempting to predict a regality level based on this information, 
we get a somewhat mixed result. The rivers produce fertile valleys 
between the mountains, and although the agriculture was not intensive, 
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it could sustain a considerable population. The efficient food produc-
tion, the possibility of storing and transporting food, the large territory, 
and the availability of horses and metal weapons, are all factors that 
make war likely. On the other hand, the harsh environment and the 
difficulty of traveling are factors that point in the kungic direction. The 
fertile valleys are separated by large mountains, steep cliffs and 
torrential rivers, so that the average population density was low. The 
overall expectation is that the regality level will be intermediate. 
The Yi in the Liang Shan area had a persistent caste system. 
The ruling caste, known as the Black Yi, constituted about 10% of the 
population. The rest of the population belonged to the slave caste, 
known as the White Yi. The White Yi were of mainly Han-Chinese 
decent, while the Black Yi were related to the Tibetans. These two 
castes were further subdivided into social classes. Newly captured 
slaves were lowest in rank. Through generations, the slaves could work 
their way up the hierarchy and become partly independent and even 
own slaves themselves. But the line between Black and White could 
never be crossed. Interbreeding between the two castes was 
prevented by all means. The caste system has been dissolved 
centuries ago among other Yi groups living in areas with a stronger 
Han-Chinese influence [127], [208], [210], [213], [214]. 
The political organization of the Yi was not as regal as one might 
expect for a society based on slavery. Most decisions were taken by 
public deliberation where even members of the slave caste had a say; 
and the leaders of villages and clans were chosen based partly on 
heritage and partly on merit. In some periods and in some areas there 
have been political leaders above the clan level, but these had limited 
influence in times of peace. For centuries or even millennia, the 
Chinese dynasties have tried to control the Yi territory and used Yi 
chiefs as suzerains. But the Yi have successfully rebelled time and 
again so that in effect the Yi have been mainly autonomous until the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China [127], [208], [209], 
[210], [213], [215], [216], [217], [218]. 
The political organization above the clan level - if any - was not 
strong enough to prevent the almost incessant feuds, raids and attacks 
between enemy clans or ethnic groups. The inter-clan conflicts were, 
however, of a relatively low scale where certain rules were obeyed and 
the opposing parties generally agreed to end a battle episode after a 
few hours when a winner had been found. Battles with more distant 
enemies, and in particular with the Han Chinese, were much more 
violent and merciless. Strangers that entered Yi territory without 
protection were habitually killed or enslaved [127], [208], [211], [212], 
[217], [219]. 
The available literature contains very little evidence of policing 
and punishment. Most crimes were punished by requiring that the 
offender pay compensation to the victim. Newly captured slaves were 
brutally tortured, but apart from that there is no evidence of corporal 
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punishment. Serious crimes were dealt with by persuading the offender 
to commit suicide. If he refused to do so he would be banished, but 
rarely killed [216], [218]. 
Religious rituals, linked to animism and ancestor worship, were 
controlled by priests and shamans. The priests (bimo) always belonged 
to the White slave caste. Their skills were transmitted mainly from 
father to son. Major political and judicial decisions required consultation 
of a priest and performance of certain rituals. The disciplining function 
of religion was probably limited. A few sources talk about supernatural 
punishments, but there is no agreement between the different sources 
regarding the kind of punishments or even whether they took place 
before or after death. Beliefs in supernatural punishments, if any, may 
be due to Chinese influence or Christian missionaries [215], [218], 
[219]. 
The Yi had a written language, which was mastered by the 
priests and only rarely by anybody else. Writing was used only for 
preserving religious rituals and formulas, not for trade or political 
administration [215]. We can assume that the priests had considerable 
influence. Whether they used this influence mostly in the interest of 
their own caste or mostly in the interest of the Black leaders, we do not 
know.  
There is no reliable information about the fertility or birth rate of 
the Yi. Children were breastfed for 4-5 years but also given other food 
[212]. 
Suicide was customarily committed for different reasons relating 
to war, conflict, peacemaking, crime, infectious diseases and love 
[208], [210], [211]. 
The marrying age ranged usually from 9 to 21 for both girls and 
boys, though children as young as 4 or 5 could be married. Married 
girls stayed home with their parents until their first pregnancy. During 
this period they were free to have sexual relations with anybody they 
liked. For this reason, the first-born child often had another father than 
the woman's husband, but the latter had to accept the child as his own. 
Divorce was more common in the period before first pregnancy than 
after. Polygamy was rare [127], [208], [210], [212], [214], [219]. 
The sources tell very little about the life of children and nothing 
about the disciplining of children. Children were treated well, and boys 
were taught to be brave. Parents did not make toys for their children, 
but various games are known. Girls helped spinning hemp from age 4 
and boys helped tending animals from age 7-8 [219], [220]. 
Clothing, tools and houses were often embellished. The Yi were 
fond of colorful clothes as well as gold and silver. Before firearms made 
face-to-face battle superfluous, the inter-clan feuds were not only 
contests of strength, but also opportunities to compete on fancy 
clothing or flute playing. The sources show no evidence of the highly 
repetitive geometric patterns typical of regal art. Singing and dancing 
62 
was common. Song texts were mostly about everyday topics, but there 
were also war songs [127], [208], [211], [219]. 
Evaluating the Yi culture, it is surprising how a slave system 
could persist for centuries when the political and religious means of 
disciplining the population were so weak. The caste system that 
allowed slavery may have been supported by ideology or religion, but 
the religion was managed by priests belonging to the slave caste. No 
slave rebellion has been reported. The agricultural production was also 
fully in the hands of the slave caste [212]. 
The caste system and the pervasive slavery are the strongest 
indicators of regality in the Yi culture. The full-scale wars with the Han 
Chinese are also regal indicators, while the frequent inter-clan feuds 
and raids with limited casualties can hardly be considered regal 
indicators. 
The political administration, the discipline, the religion and the 
sexual morals appear to be mostly kungic. The use of body adornment 
in conflicts is a regal sign, but the adornment is hardly more elaborate 
than in other cultures. The almost complete absence of praise for gods 
or rulers in art and songs is an indication of a fairly kungic art. 
Yanomamo 
This culture is considered here only for the purpose of the 
discussion in the section "Search for exceptions to the theory" on page 
23. 
The Yanomamo lived in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil and 
Venezuela. They resided mainly in semi-permanent villages with 20-
400 inhabitants. Slash-and-burn agriculture was their main source of 
food. They were capable of living a nomadic life as hunters and gather-
ers, and it is speculated that they might have done so in pre-Columbian 
times since their main crop - plantains - has been brought to the Ameri-
cas by Europeans. They traveled almost exclusively by foot on narrow 
paths that were almost invisible to foreigners. Many trails were impas-
sable in the wet season. They went barefoot and almost naked. They 
had little or no means for sailing on the rivers; and they could cross big 
rivers only with difficulty. They had no domestic animals besides dogs. 
Their main weapons were clubs and bows and arrows. Arrow tips were 
mostly made of wood or bone, poisoned with curare. Metal tools were 
obtained by barter [68], [70], [71], [221], [222], [223]. 
The cultivation of high-yield crops made room for large village 
populations, but the dependence on hunting for acquiring protein made 
it necessary that each village had a sufficient hunting territory. This 
makes us predict that wars were likely; and the wars would be aggra-
vated by the availability of strong arrow poison. On the other hand, the 
difficulty of traveling through the rain forest and the low overall 
population density are factors that reduced the possibilities for war. 
Considering these opposing factors, we will predict an intermediate 
level of regality. 
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The Yanomamo have a reputation for fierceness in war, but 
there has been considerable controversy among anthropologists over 
how fierce the Yanomamo actually were, why they fought, and whether 
their raids can be classified as war. It is undisputed, however, that 
violence was a frequent cause of death in some areas [68], [70], [224]. 
In their own understanding, the Yanomamo conducted raids 
against other villages for purposes of retaliation and to capture women. 
They were well aware that the enemy might move away as a conse-
quence of a conflict, but they rarely mentioned the desire to make the 
enemy move away as a motivation for attack [68], [70], [221], [223]. An 
ethologist has suggested that we make a distinction between the 
proximate cause of Yanomamo warfare, which is the personal 
motivation, and the ultimate cause of the warfare, which is connected 
to the evolutionary function of securing a sufficiently large hunting 
territory [225]. Since Yanomamo conflicts had territorial consequences, 
we will classify them as wars with regard to regality theory. 
The Yanomamo had no political organization above the level of 
the village, and the village headman had very little authority. There was 
no organized system of justice and punishment other than retaliation. 
Even rape and murder could go unpunished if there were no relatives 
to retaliate for the victim. Personal conflicts were handled by fighting 
duels. These duels were formalized and rule-governed. Afterwards, the 
issue was regarded as settled regardless of the outcome of the duel. 
However, a duel might sometimes escalate into collective fighting or 
even war, especially if somebody died [71], [226], [227]. 
The religious beliefs of the Yanomamo involved a close 
connection with animals and spirits. Many men were shamans. They 
took strong hallucinogenic drugs in order to get in contact with, or even 
become, spirits. They manipulated the spirits for purposes of curing 
diseases and for harming their enemies. They had no supernatural 
rulers, and only weak concepts of supernatural punishment after death 
[71], [222], [228]. 
The fertility was controlled by breastfeeding, abortion, infanticide 
and magical anticonception means. Birth spacing was 2-5 years. The 
overall fertility was 4 - 8 children per woman. Extramarital sex occurred 
when detection could be avoided. It was common for a man to share 
his wife with his brothers. Rape was common [71], [221], [222], [226], 
[227]. 
Most girls married soon after puberty. Girls might be married 
before puberty, but they did not live with their husband until after first 
menstruation. Men married at age 18 - 30. They often married for 
economic and strategic rather than romantic reasons. Girls had little 
self-determination about whom to marry. Polygyny and polyandry 
occurred. There was no marriage ceremony. Wife beating was normal. 
Divorce was common [70], [71], [221], [222], [227]. 
Children were rarely disciplined, but boys were taught to be 
fierce and to retaliate. Children were given miniature tools and other 
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toys. Girls were obliged to do work from a much younger age than boys 
[70], [221], [222], [226], [227]. 
The Yanomamo produced little art. Body painting was made as 
much for magical reasons as for decoration. Different colors and 
patterns were used for war paint, hunting, shamanism, etc. Some 
patterns symbolized or imitated various animals. Piercings in ears, lips 
and nasal septum were decorated with long sticks or feathers. Arrow 
tips were often decorated, while clay pots were not. Dance and singing 
was common. There were few or no music instruments. Myths and 
stories did not glorify war [71], [223], [226], [228], [229]. 
The conclusion for the Yanomamo is that the level of war is 
intermediate while the political organization, justice, discipline, religion, 
sexuality and art all tend in the kungic direction. The strong male 




Table 9. Factor loadings for factor analysis of table 2. 
Variable 
number Variable name F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 
V64, V156 Population density 0.30  0.50 0.20 0.15
V61 Fixity of settlement 0.23  0.67  -0.25 0.13 0.20
V62 Compactness of settlement 0.30 -0.15  -0.18  -0.11
V63 Community size   0.91 
V66 Large or impressive structures 0.39  0.25  -0.18 0.19
V149 Writing and records 0.66 -0.2  0.11 0.11 -0.11
V152 Urbanization -0.13  0.93 
V203 Dependence on gathering -0.11  -0.44  -0.14 -0.21 -0.92
V204 Dependence on hunting -0.16  -0.74  -0.38 -0.27
V205 Dependence on fishing -0.11  -0.16  -0.21 0.94 0.22
V206 Dependence on animal husbandry  -0.17  0.98 0.1
V207 Dependence on agriculture 0.19  0.92  -0.29 -0.27 0.27
V677 Migration -0.31 0.26   0.13 0.16
V732 Importance of trade in subsistence 0.13 -0.10   
V1265 Occurrence of famine 0.22    0.11
V1267 Severity of famine 0.23  -0.12  
V1684 Threat of weather of pest disasters    0.14 0.17
V1685 Chronic resource problems -0.12  -0.11 0.15 0.15
V1260 Total pathogen stress 0.21 0.42  -0.25
V854 Niche temperature 0.21 0.42  -0.24 -0.24
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V855 Niche rainfall -0.17  0.41  -0.3 0.19 0.11
V921 Agricultural potential 0.19  0.30 0.13 -0.20 -0.13 -0.20
V1122 Total population 0.58  0.22  0.14 -0.13
V157 Political integration 0.91    
V1132 Political integration, state 0.41 -0.12 0.15  0.12 
V158 Social stratification 0.79    
V72 Intercommunity marriage 0.10 -0.17 0.15  -0.39 0.12
V861, V79 Polygamy -0.26 0.37 0.38   -0.20
V82 Trend in autonomy 0.51 -0.20    
V83 Levels of sovereignty 0.87  0.14 -0.11 
V237 Jurisdictional hierarchy 0.92    
V270 Class stratification 0.77    
V272 Caste stratification 0.21    0.22 -0.15
V274 Type of slavery 0.11 0.22   0.22 0.12
V920 Proportion of slaves 0.14  0.12  
V79, V1133 Polygamy, Maximum harem size 0.13 0.22 0.28 -0.31  -0.26 -0.12
V1134 Despotic bias in conflict resolution 0.41 0.32   -0.20




Frequency of external warfare 0.14 0.24 0.39 -0.12  
V892 Frequency of external war - Attacking 0.16 0.56 0.13 -0.19  
V893 Frequency of external war - Being attacked 0.46    -0.13
V668 Wives taken from hostile groups 0.34 -0.12 0.10 0.14
V894 Form of military mobilization 0.27 0.53    
V902 Leadership during battle 0.40 0.45    0.15
V903 Prestige, soldiers or warriors -0.13 0.82    
V905 Rewards for killing enemy -0.22 0.73  0.17  
V907 Value of war 0.72    
V908 Military success 0.37    0.10
V909 Subjugation of territory or people 0.61    
V1654 Pacification -0.23 -0.23    
V1649, V1748, 
V773, V891 Frequency of internal warfare 0.12 0.17 0.34  -0.11 0.13
V666 Interpersonal violence -0.15 0.51    
V906 Expect violence to solve problems 0.54    
V1776 Intraethnic violence -0.16 0.42   0.16
V1665 Homicide 0.17 0.56   
V1666 Assault 0.13 0.63  -0.15 
V1667 Theft 0.16 0.47  -0.18 
V1676 Socially organized assault 0.36   
V1677 Socially organized theft 0.40   -0.14
V1678 Socially organized trespass 0.23   0.20
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V1721 Rich people -0.13 0.31  0.13 0.20
V1726 Communality of land -0.28 -0.16 0.40 -0.13  
V24, V25 Bodily restrictiveness in infancy 0.12 -0.16    -0.16
V31 Infant crying response 0.24   -0.10
V33 Childhood pain infliction 0.26   -0.12 0.10
V41 Autonomy-encouragement in childhood 0.17   0.14 0.15
V43 Covering genitals - age 0.18 -0.1 -0.11  0.30
V44, V45 Weaning age -0.11 -0.10 0.19   -0.11 0.13
V53, V54 Role of father, infancy/early childhood -0.25    
V242 Segregation of adolescent boys -0.18 0.40   
V293 Duration of early childhood -0.14 0.24   
V831, V832 Differentiation of adolescence from childhood 0.12   0.13
V453, V454, 
V455, V456 Corporal punishment of boys/girls 0.35   0.18 
V667 Rape 0.30  0.12 
V34 Post-partum sex taboo 0.21 0.13  -0.14
V671 Menstrual taboos 0.28  0.20 
V672 Male avoidance of female sexuality -0.18 0.29   0.11
V827, V828 Sexual expression in adolescent boys/girls 0.20 0.26 -0.17  -0.13
V829, V830 Sexual nonrestraint in adolescent boys/girls    
V740 Marriage arrangements (Female) 0.15 0.28   0.20 -0.11
V864 Rooming arrangement for wives 0.28 0.27 0.27 -0.14 0.11 0.11
V868 Multiple wives for leaders, headman, chiefs 0.14 0.37  -0.20 
V664 Ideology of male toughness -0.11 0.32   
V657 Flexible marriage mores -0.11 0.16 0.19  -0.17 0.12
V661 Female political participation -0.26 0.21   -0.17 0.16 -0.12
V665 Male segregation 0.41  0.15 
V238 High gods 0.13 -0.13    0.33 -0.13 0.10
V713 Classical religion -0.22    
V529, V530 Adolescent initiation ceremonies -0.13 0.12 0.33 -0.11  0.22 -0.25
V1188 Evil eye 0.14 0.12   0.44 0.11
V1694, V1695 Scarification -0.11 0.19   
 Total factor loading 7.198 4.723 4.492 3.705 2.423 2.400 1.911 1.744
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